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seasoned equity offerings from 38 countries between 1990 and 2003. We provide estimates of the
change in each accounting variable for each dollar raised in an equity offer, and for each dollar of
internally generated cash. Our estimates imply that firms invest 18.8 cents in R&D and 7.3 cents in
capital expenditures for an incremental dollar raised in an equity offer during the year following the
offer, rising to 84.8 cents and 14.3 cents when the change is measured over a four-year period. These
findings are consistent with one motive for the equity offer being to raise capital for investment.
However, firms also hold onto much of the cash they raised, and this fraction is higher when the firm
has a high q. In addition, firms are more likely to issue secondary shares, which are usually sold by
insiders, when q is high, enabling insiders to benefit personally from potential overvaluation. These
results suggest that market timing as well as investment financing is a motivation for equity offers.
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The relation between equity markets and firms’ real decisions is an old and still extremely 
important topic in finance.  Understanding this relation is complicated by the fact that there are a number 
of channels through which equity markets can affect firms.  First, firms can raise capital to finance 
investments by selling equity in the public market.  Additionally, if equity prices are higher than 
warranted by firms’ fundamentals, then by issuing equity, firms can increase the value of existing shares 
at the expense of new shareholders.
1  Finally, when firms sell equity for the first time in an initial public 
offering, the firm changes in a number of ways that increase the liquidity of insiders’ portfolios and the 
firm’s access to capital.  Thus, there are at least three possible, not necessarily mutually exclusive, 
motives for equity offerings:  to finance investments, to transfer wealth from new shareholders to existing 
shareholders, and to increase liquidity for both insiders and the firm. 
The academic literature has not yet distinguished fully between these explanations.  The only 
empirical paper that addresses the question of the motivation for initial offerings is Pagano, Panetta, and 
Zingales (1998).  These authors find that for a sample of Italian IPOs, the predominant reason why firms 
go public is to rebalance their capital structure and to exploit mispricing rather than to raise capital for 
financing investments.  For seasoned offerings, a number of papers have addressed the mispricing 
explanation; Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Baker and Wurgler (2000) are notable contributions.  In 
addition, Greenwood (2005) finds that higher cash holdings lead to lower future returns at the aggregate 
level, consistent with firms issuing equity when their shares are overvalued rather than when they have a 
particularly high demand for capital.   
However, these papers do not link the equity issues with the subsequent firm-level investments.  
The literature is remarkably silent on the fundamental question underlying equity issues (and other capital 
raising activities):  How is the money raised in the offering used by the firms that raise it?  This paper 
provides systematic evidence on this question as well as other potential motives for issuing publicly-
                                                 
1 Discussion of the possibility of selling overvalued equity to finance investments goes back at least to Keynes 
(1936), p. 151.  For further discussion and tests of this idea, see Fischer and Merton (1984), Barro (1990), 




traded equity.  It relies on a sample of 16,958 initial public offerings and 12,373 seasoned equity offerings 
from 38 countries, covering the 1990-2003 period.  The focus is on the ultimate use of the capital raised, 
how this use varies with firm valuation, and how this variation is consistent with alternative motivations 
for equity offers.  
To understand the reasons for equity offerings, it is important to distinguish between equity 
offerings that raise capital and those that do not.  One aspect of equity offerings not emphasized by the 
corporate finance literature is the fact that firms have a choice of what kind of shares to offer.  Firms can 
issue new, primary shares, or offer existing shares held by insiders, which are known as secondary shares.  
Only primary share issuances can be used to finance investments, since they lead to capital inflows to the 
firm while secondary share offers do not.
2   
We first document the extent to which firms offer primary and secondary shares in public equity 
offerings across the different regions in our sample. We find that the proportion of primary shares sold is 
roughly 80% in IPOs and 60% in SEOs.  For IPOs, this fraction varies internationally, with Asian 
countries typically having the highest fraction of primary shares, European countries having the lowest, 
and the United States in between.  Cross-regional variation in SEOs is smaller than in IPOs, although 
European countries still exhibit the lowest proportion of primary shares. 
To examine the effect of equity offerings on investment, we next consider a variety of alternative 
accounting variables designed to capture the uses of the capital raised in the IPOs and SEOs.  While it is 
almost definitional that new capital into the firm has to show up somewhere on the books, there are a 
number of alternative possible uses for the capital.  We examine increases in total assets, inventory, 
capital expenditures, acquisitions, R&D, cash, and long-term debt reduction.  We measure the increases in 
each variable over a variety of time intervals, ranging from one year to four years, and compare them 
across the types of shares being offered. 
                                                 
2 Existing theoretical models on IPOs do not seem to incorporate the two types of shares simultaneously.    For 
example, Chemmanur and Fulghieri(1999)’s model considers sale of primary shares to fund a new investment 
project, while Zingales(1995) and Mello and Parsons(1998) focus on the sale of secondary shares and does not 




Univariate statistics on changes in these variables following IPOs indicate that primary only 
offerings have the highest increases in most of the variables, followed by combined offerings and 
secondary only offerings.  Moreover, the magnitude of primary issues is significantly correlated with 
increases in capital expenditure, R&D expenditure and cash holdings up to four years after the IPO.  In 
contrast, the value of the secondary offerings is not related to these variables in most cases.   
We next formally estimate the increase in the accounting variables that represent possible uses of 
the capital raised following IPOs.  In doing so, we control econometrically for other sources of funds, 
firm size, as well as year and country fixed effects.  The largest increase is for cash holdings; for every 
dollar raised in the IPO, cash holdings rise by 1.067 cents in the year after the IPO.  This decreases to 
88.8 cents over a four-year period after the IPO as the money is spent on various projects.  The largest 
expenditures appear to be on R&D and capital expenditures, which increase by 18.8 cents and 7.3 cents 
respectively per dollar raised in the year following the IPO, and by 84.8 cents and 14.3 cents over a four-
year period. These results are consistent with the investment financing motivations for the equity offer 
and suggest that capital raising is a lumpy process, so that firms raise capital and spend it over a relatively 
long period of time. 
We estimate similar equations predicting the uses of funds on the sample of SEOs.  As for IPOs, 
there are substantial and statistically significant increases in investments, including R&D, capital 
expenditures, acquisitions and inventory.  This finding suggests that one motivation for SEOs is to raise 
capital for investments.  In addition, firms appear to save a substantial fraction of cash raised in SEOs, 
which declines somewhat as the time horizon gets longer.  This high savings rate could reflect firms’ 
issuing equity when their stock price is high, even if they do not have unusually good investment 
opportunities.   
Finally, we explore the extent of market timing motivations in a more direct manner by relating 
Tobin’s q with the issuance and investment decisions in SEOs.  First, we examine how the fraction of 
types of shares sold in an SEO is affected by potential mispricing. If firms sell shares because the stock 




personal shares through a secondary offering.  In contrast, if we observe a firm issuing equity at times 
when the price is relatively low, then we would expect a higher proportion of shares sold to be primary.  
We find that, controlling for other factors, a higher abnormal valuation proxied by Tobin’s q or residuals 
from a first-stage regression of q on fundamentals implies a higher fraction of secondary shares in the 
offering.  These results are consistent with market timing stories; when equity values, reflected by q, are 
high, managers are more likely to sell their own shares in a secondary offering so that they can benefit 
personally. 
We also examine whether the sensitivity of investment to primary capital raised in SEOs varies 
according to the level of Tobin’s q.  We do so because SEOs done to take advantage of high valuation 
should occur in firms with relatively high q’s.  To the extent that these SEOs do provide additional 
capital, the new funds should be more likely to be kept as cash.  However, when the purpose of the SEO 
is to provide capital for investments, we expect to see more of the money raised to be used to pay for 
these investments.  Consistent with this intuition, we find that following an SEO, firms with low Tobin’s 
q’s spend relatively more on capital expenditures and long term debt reductions than firms with high q’s.  
In contrast, firms with high q tend to keep more cash from a marginal dollar raised than do low q firms.  
These findings suggest that when firms with low q’s do seasoned offerings, the purpose of these offerings 
is to fund investments, while firms with high q’s are more likely to do seasoned offerings to take 
advantage of their higher valuation. 
Overall, the results suggest that equity offerings are done both to raise capital for investment and 
to exploit favorable market conditions.  Firms sometimes issue public equity to take advantage of a hot 
market.  When they do so they are more likely to use secondary offerings so that they can profit 
personally or if they do issue primary shares, then they tend to keep the proceeds as cash.  However, firms 
also issue equity when stock prices are less favorable.  In these cases, the offerings are more likely to be 
composed of primary shares and they tend to use the funds they raise to finance R&D, to purchase 




  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows:  Section I describes our data sources and our 
sample. Section II provides the distribution of primary and secondary shares offered in IPOs and SEOs 
across the 38 countries.  Section III presents the averages of subsequent increases in assets and 
expenditures for each of the three IPOs offer types and estimates the relation between the capital raised 
and increases in investments.  Section IV estimates similar equations examining the relation between 
capital raised and increases in investment for SEOs.  Section V reports the relation between Tobin’s q of 
the firm doing the offering and the proportion of secondary shares in the offering.  It also presents results 
indicating how the valuation, reflected by q, affects the use of these proceeds.  Section VI is a short 
conclusion. 
    
I.  Data Sources and Sample Description 
A.  Data Sources 
We obtain our IPO and SEO data from SDC Global New Issues Database. This database provides 
information on total proceeds and the number of primary and secondary shares offered for each IPO and 
SEO.  WorldScope provides the accounting data for our sample of equity offers.  We augment 
WorldScope with Standard and Poor’s Xpressfeed, which provides U.S. and international data 
comparable to Compustat.  SDC has very limited coverage for non-U.S. offers prior to 1990, so we set 
our sample period to be from January 1990 to December 2003. 
From all IPOs reported in SDC, we first eliminate those observations that do not contain 
information on the total number of shares sold or the breakdown of these shares into primary and 
secondary shares.  We also exclude IPOs where the reported value of proceeds is inconsistent with the 
offer price and the number of shares sold by more than $5 million.  A total of 2,301 IPOs and 7,090 SEOs 




exclude all private placements and rights offerings (16,415 SEOs).
3  We then exclude the following firms 
from our sample:  
(a)  All utilities (3 digit SIC's from 491 to 494) : 250 IPOs, 508 SEOs 
(b)  All financials(1 digit SIC 6) : 5,057 IPOs, 3,858 SEOs 
(c)  All privatizations: 173 IPOs, 160 SEOs.
4 
(d)  All telecoms(2 digit SIC 48): 655 IPOs
5, 682 SEOs 
(e)  All transition economies: 1,117 IPOs, 164 SEOs from China, Hungary, Poland and Russia 
(f)  All nations with fewer than 10 IPO's during the sample period: 89 IPOs from 32 countries, 
338 SEOs from 45 countries  
 
These requirements are imposed to identify a sample of non-regulated private firms that issue 
publicly-traded equity.
6  After applying these filters, we end up with a sample of 16,958 IPOs and 12,373 
SEOs from 38 countries, each occurring between 1990 and 2003.
7 
B.  Equity Issues Around the World 
Table I presents descriptive statistics on our sample.  Panels A-1 and A-2 present the number of 
IPOs and SEOs across different regions over time while Panels B-1 and B-2 report the total value of 
proceeds raised in IPOs and SEOs, respectively.  The U.S. is by far the largest IPO market in our sample, 
accounting for 27% of all IPOs in terms of numbers and 45% in terms of total proceeds.
8   European IPOs 
are somewhat modest both in numbers and value in the early 1990s, but start to pick up in the mid 1990s 
and surpass the U.S. in the total number of IPOs by the late 1990s.  Asian IPOs peak in the mid 1990s and 
then drop significantly in 1998-99 after the financial crisis of 1997.  Although Asian IPOs comprise 37% 
                                                 
3 Forty percent of private placements and rights offerings are from Australia.  These offerings tend to be very small. 
4 The privatizations are identified from Boutchkova and Megginson (2000), Belke and Schneider (2003), and 
Hoover's Online.  For all IPOs which raised more than $100 million that are not identified as privatizations in the 
previous two papers, we manually checked Hoover’s Online to verify whether the IPO was a privatization or not.  
For those IPOs that were not identified on Hoover’s Online, we checked the company’s website if it had one as of 
June 2004.  Subsequent SEOs by these firms are also excluded from the sample.  
5 Telecoms are similar to utilities in terms of regulations, and many of them also overlap with privatizations.   
6 Concurrent issues both in domestic market and in foreign market in the form of ADRs or direct cross listings are 
counted as one issue, and the total proceeds and the number of shares are aggregated after adjusting for differences 
in currencies.   
7 Roughly two-thirds of the IPOs and half of the SEOs do not have accounting information just prior to the issue, 
partly because our accounting data stops at 2001.  
8  The amount raised through ADRs is included in the country of origin rather than in the U.S.  Canadian domestic 




in terms of numbers, they only account for 12% of the total proceeds, implying that Asian IPOs are 
generally smaller on average than other IPOs.
9   
The cross-regional pattern for SEOs is somewhat similar to IPOs.  The U.S. is the largest issuer, 
with 37% of the issues and 49% of the proceeds.  Other regions are noticeably smaller, with none 
accounting for more than 20% of the total issues or proceeds.  Unlike the IPO time series, SEOs continue 
both in U.S. and also worldwide, even after the market decline in 2000, with the total number remaining 
fairly constant at close to one thousand per year.  The proceeds raised in the SEOs decline with the stock 
market after 2000, so that the amount in 2003 is only 40% of 2000.  However, the magnitude of the 
decline is proportionately smaller compared to IPOs, where the proceeds in 2003 is less than a quarter of 
2000.  This time-series pattern suggests that IPOs may be more sensitive to market valuations than SEOs.  
 
II. Primary vs. Secondary Offers 
Equity offers vary along a number of dimensions, an important one of which is the type of shares 
being sold to the public.  Firms have a choice of selling new, ‘primary’ shares, or existing, ‘secondary’ 
shares.  A primary offering increases the number of shares outstanding and raises capital for the firm, 
while secondary offerings keep the number of shares outstanding constant and has no revenue 
consequences to the firm.  A third type of offering is a combination of the two, selling some new shares 
and some previously-owned shares. 
Table II presents statistics on the three types of equity offers in our sample.  Panels A-1 and A-2 
report the number of IPOs and SEOs that belong in each of the three categories, while Panels B-1 and B-2 
present total proceeds from each type.
10  Panels B-1 and B-2 also separate combined offerings into 
primary shares and secondary shares and report the proceeds for each type within the combined category.  
Clearly, primary offerings are the most common, comprising 76.2% of IPOs and 60.7% of SEOs.  Pure 
secondary offerings are relatively uncommon especially for IPOs, accounting for only 1.7% of IPOs and 
                                                 
9 Almost 60% of Asian IPOs are from India, and Indian IPOs tend to be very small.  The median value of proceeds 
in India is only US$ 0.7 million, compared to the global median of US$30 million. 




18.7% of SEOs, while the remaining 22.2% of IPOs and 20.7% of SEOs are combinations of primary and 
secondary offerings.  We can infer the total value raised from primary shares and secondary shares 
respectively by separating out the proceeds from the combined category into those raised from primary 
shares and those raised from secondary shares and adding them back into proceeds from primary only and 
secondary only offerings.  The last five columns of panels B-1 and B-2 in Table II present these 
calculations.   
Overall, 79% of the total proceeds in IPOs are comprised of new capital raised through primary 
shares.  However, there are distinct cross-regional variations.  Other than Japan, Asian IPOs tend to offer 
mostly primary shares, with primary offerings accounting for more than 95% of the proceeds of the IPOs.  
In contrast, European IPOs exhibit relatively higher percentages of secondary only (12.8% of the 
proceeds) and combined offerings (33.5%), and lower percentage of primary only offerings (53.8%).  
These differences could potentially reflect differences in the institutional environment and are consistent 
with the high rate of secondary offerings in Europe that has been documented elsewhere.  In the Pagano, 
Panetta, and Zingales (1998) sample, for example, only 41% were primary-only offerings and 49% were 
secondary-only.  Similarly, Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) report that 67% of IPOs in Portugal and 
23% in Germany were entirely secondary in the 1980s and early 1990s.  In addition, Jenkinson and 
Ljungqvist report that European IPOs have begun using a higher proportion of primary offerings since the 
early 1990s.  Both the fact that Europe has traditionally had a high proportion of secondary offerings, as 
well as the recent change towards primary offerings within Europe, suggest that perhaps the conclusions 
of Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998) should be reexamined, since that study contains only 69 IPOs 
from one European country in the 1980s. 
For SEOs, the proportion of primary shares is relatively smaller than in IPOs, accounting for 58% 
of the total proceeds.  Unlike IPOs, cross-regional differences seem to be less apparent, although 




broadly consistent with the numbers reported in Asquith and Mullins (1986) for an earlier time period.
11  
At first, the pattern of seasoned offerings containing more secondary issues may seem counterintuitive 
since the insiders in a publicly traded firm can sell their shares directly in the open market.  However, 
regulations regarding the disclosure of insider trading restrict insiders from selling freely in the market, 
leading them to resort to SEOs for selling their secondary shares.  
 
III. Investment Financing as a Motivation for Initial Public Offerings 
  Going public is generally considered a watershed moment in a firm’s history, being associated 
with a number of important changes.  Once a firm is publicly-traded, there is a market in which 
executives and other insiders can sell their shares.  In addition, the firm can raise capital in public equity 
(and possibly debt) markets, and the firm faces increased disclosure and regulatory requirements.  Yet, 
one possible explanation for going public that is sometimes overlooked is the capital that is raised at the 
time of the issue. 
One empirical study examining the motives for IPOs is Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998).  
These authors find that in their sample of Italian IPOs from the 1980s, investments do not increase 
following the IPO, suggesting that demand for capital is not a major reason for going public.  The extent 
to which these findings extend to a broader sample of firms in other countries in other time periods is 
clearly of interest. 
A. Univariate Analysis of Increases in Investments across IPO Offer Types 
   A clear prediction of the hypothesis that firms issue equity to raise capital for investments is that 
investments should be larger for firms raising capital through an equity issue than they would have been 
had the firms not done the equity issue.  We do not, of course, know what firms’ investments would have 
been had they not raised capital.  We do, however, have a sample of firms that did secondary equity issues 
that were not associated with capital raising, because the revenues from those sales do not belong to the 
                                                 
11 Asquith and Mullins (1986) report that out of 266 SEOs by U.S. industrial firms from 1963 to 1981, 48% were 
primary only, 32% were secondary only, and 20% were combined offerings.  In our U.S. subsample, primary-only 




firm.  We expect investments to increase more for firms that do primary issues than those doing 
secondary issues, with combined issues in between.  We first compare univariate statistics on possible 
uses of funds for firms doing alternative types of equity offers.  Subsequently, we estimate 
econometrically the expected use of incremental dollars raised in equity offerings. 
We measure changes in seven accounting variables, each of which captures a potential use of the 
funds raised.  In particular, we consider changes in total assets, inventory, capital expenditure, acquisition, 
R&D, and cash, as well as reductions in long-term debt.
12  The first five variables are meant to capture 
possible ways in which the capital could be invested in real assets, while changes in cash holdings and 
reductions in long-term debt measure possible uses of the funds other than direct investment.  To 
minimize the impact of outliers, we focus on a logarithmic transformation of each variable.  For balance 
sheet items (total assets, inventory, and cash), we calculate the log of one plus the change in each variable 
normalized by total assets prior to the IPO:  ( ) ] 1 ) assets   total ln[( 0 0 + −V Vt , where V is the variable 
being measured, year 0 is the fiscal year end just prior to the IPO and year t is number of years after year 
0.  For income statement and cash flow statement items (capital expenditure, acquisition, R&D and 
reduction in long-term debt), we consider the log of one plus the accumulation in each variable since the 
IPO, normalized by total assets prior to the IPO:  ] 1 assets   total ln[( ) 0 1 + ∑ =
t
i i V .  
Table III reports the means and medians of this normalized increase for each variable, broken 
down by offer type.  This table computes the changes for periods between one year and four years in 
length.  It also presents t-statistics for comparisons of means between the primary-only and combined 
groups, and between the combined and secondary-only groups, as well as the Mann-Whitney z-statistic 
for comparison of medians.   
We consider differences between offer types to examine the linkage between new, primary capital 
coming into the firm, and increases in subsequent investment.  The numbers in Table III indicate that 
except for a few cases, increases are the largest in the primary-only group, followed by the combined 
                                                 
12 Capital expenditures, acquisitions and reduction in long-term debt are directly taken from the cash flow statement, 




group.  IPOs that only offer secondary shares exhibit the lowest increases in most cases.  Moreover, the 
differences in increases of these variables between IPO offer types are generally statistically significant.   
The correlation between IPO type and the increases in total assets probably reflects that primary 
offers are used at the fastest growing firms.  Firms that are growing the fastest are likely to have the 
greatest demand for external capital, to pay for both direct investments and indirect investments. 
While the correlation between increase in total assets and IPO type could come through a number 
of channels, the correlation between the increases in the investment variables (inventory, capital 
expenditures, acquisitions, and research and development) and the type of IPO provides more direct 
evidence.  In particular, it seems likely that firms increasing investments most rapidly have the greatest 
demand for capital, and thus choose to issue primary shares when they go public.  A desire to fund 
investments in inventory, capital expenditures, acquisitions and research and development could lead 
some firms to go public.  In contrast, firms that go public to allow managers to cash out through 
secondary offers will have, on average, a lower demand for capital.  As a result, we could observe the 
pattern documented in Table III, in which primary offers are associated with higher increases in 
investment than secondary offers. 
Increases in cash could be due to firm’s motivations to enhance financial flexibility independent 
of the valuation in the market or it could be a result of active market timing efforts without investment 
opportunities as suggested by Greenwood (2005).  We attempt to distinguish between these two 
possibilities in Section V. 
In summary, the differences in normalized increases in the seven variables across different types 
of IPO offerings for various horizons suggest that the firms in each group might have different 
motivations for going public.  Firms issuing primary shares appear to use the capital both to increase 
investment, and to increase financial flexibility, presumably to be able to fund future investments.   
Yet, while these comparisons are suggestive, they omit at least four potentially important 
considerations.  First, Table II documents that type of IPO is highly correlated with the place of issue and 




differently in different countries.  Second, Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) suggest that there has been a 
secular trend towards primary issues at least in Europe, which should be controlled for econometrically.  
Third, the univariate comparisons make no use of the quantity of equity that is issued, which certainly 
could affect the use of the funds.  Finally, we do not consider differences within the ‘combined’ category; 
presumably a firm that issues 99% primary shares and 1% secondary is different from one that issues 99% 
secondary and 1% primary.  We next consider the normalized increases in our accounting variables in a 
mutivariate setting, controlling for these factors. 
B.  Multivariate Analysis of Changes in Accounting Variables across IPO Offer Types  
To estimate the uses of the capital raised in the equity offering, we rely on a specification that 
allows primary capital from the equity offering, secondary capital from the equity offering, and other 
sources of funds to enter the specification separately.  We normalize each by total assets and take the log 
of one plus the normalized cash flow as a way of minimizing the effect of outliers.
13   We also include the 
log of total assets as a control for size and fixed effects for year and country, and use heteroscdasticity-
consistent standard errors clustered by two-digit SIC industry.
14  For each of seven possible uses of the 
capital raised, we estimate:  
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13 We also repeat the analysis without the log transformation using the quantile (median) regression approach.  The 
results are similar to the logarithmic results discussed below. 
14 We exclude those IPOs where the value of the total asset prior to the IPO is less than 5% of the total proceeds 




and t = 1, 2, 3, 4 years after the IPO.  Total sources of funds include internally generated cash flows from 




Table IV presents estimates of Equation (1), omitting the country and year fixed effects as well as 
the coefficient on total assets for the sake of brevity.  The coefficients on primary capital raised in the IPO 
and on other sources of capital are mostly positive and significantly different from zero.  In contrast, the 
coefficients on the value of secondary shares sold are generally small and statistically insignificant from 
zero.  While it is not surprising that the coefficients on secondary capital sales are zero given that the 
revenues from these sales do not belong to the firm, they do suggest that the results are picking up a true, 
rather than a spurious relation between new capital and investment. 
Comparing the coefficients between those on new capital from the equity offering with those 
from other sources of capital, which is primarily internally-generated, makes it possible to draw 
inferences about the underlying reasons for the equity offering.  In other words, differences in coefficients 
are likely to reflect differences in propensities to use alternative sources of capital for alternative uses.  
The results in Table IV indicate that the coefficients on primary capital raised in equity offerings are 
substantially larger than the corresponding coefficients for the other sources of capital for two years in the 
equations estimating the changes in capital expenditures and up to four years in R&D, and cash.  These 
findings suggest that the funds raised in an IPO are more likely to be used for investments in new capital 
and research.  In addition, the coefficients on changes in cash holdings suggest that new capital raised is 
more likely to be saved as cash than are internally generated funds. 
In contrast, the coefficients on acquisitions and on long-term debt reductions are larger on 
internally-generated capital than on new capital.   This pattern indicates debt reductions and acquisitions 
                                                 
15 Specifically, total sources of funds is the sum of funds from operations, sale of property, plant and equipment, 
long term debt issuances, and sale of common and preferred stock.  This variable is available In WorldScope.  In 
Compustat Xpressfeed, this variable needs to be constructed from the component variables. 
16 We have also estimated this equations including firm age as another independent variable with similar results.  
This variable is only available for approximately 1/3 of the sample, so we choose to report the results without this 




are more likely to be paid for by internally-generated than new capital.  This result differ from Pagano, 
Panetta, and Zingales (1998), who suggest that capital raised in IPOs tends to be used to pay off long-
term debt.  Overall, the comparisons between the estimated uses of internally-generated and new capital 
are consistent with the view that capital raised in IPOs is used to fund new investments. 
There is a consistent pattern between the coefficients for the equations representing different time 
horizons used in computing the dependent variables.  For the equations representing changes in 
expenditures on inventory, capital expenditures, acquisitions and R&D, the coefficients on primary 
capital are generally increasing over time.  This pattern suggests that the capital raised is not used all at 
once but rather partially saved and used in the future.  Consistent with this pattern is the fact that the 
corresponding coefficients on changes in cash holdings have the opposite pattern. These coefficients 
decrease with the time horizon of the dependent variables, suggesting that firms initially hold the capital 
as cash and pay it down over time. 
A useful way to compare the effects of new capital across different uses is to calculate from each 
equation the change in the accounting variable implied from a dollar increase in new capital.  This value 
provides a consistent way of comparing the relative importance of alternative uses of the cash raised.
17 
We also report the implied changes from a dollar increase in other sources as a benchmark.  The results of 
these calculations are also presented in Table IV.  For the total assets variable, the implied change from a 
dollar increase in primary capital is close to one for one year after the IPO, which is not surprising since 
the book value of assets mechanically increases dollar for dollar whenever new capital is raised.
18  
Nonetheless, the fact that the implied change in assets for a dollar raised is close to a dollar suggests that 
the specification we use is picking up real rather than spurious effects.   
                                                 
17 The calculations are based on a median-sized firm in 1996 in US.  For example, the dollar changes in inventory 
for t = 1 is calculated as follows:  Median primary capital is 24, median secondary capital is 0, median total sources 
is 33.9 and median total assets prior to IPO are 24.4. (All units are in $US mil). Using these inputs together with 
coefficients from table IV yields 0.00742 as the predicted value of the log transformation, implying a predicted 
change of 0.182 in inventory.  Then we add one to median primary capital and repeat the above procedure, which 
results in a predicted change of 0.199 in inventory.  The difference in the two predicted changes represents the dollar 
changes in inventory for 1 unit increase in primary capital, which is given by 0.017.  




For the other variables, the implied change per dollar raised is the largest for the change in cash 
holdings.  These estimates imply that a large fraction of each dollar raised is kept in cash holdings; in year 
one, firms hold 106.7 cents in cash for every dollar they raise, decreasing over time to 88.8 cents when 
changes are computed over four years.  While the numbers are somewhat difficult to take literally, as the 
model predicts that the expected change in spending is more than $1 for every dollar raised, they do 
suggest that firms keep a substantial fraction of the funds raised as cash, for at least four years after the 
IPO.  This finding is consistent with the view that one of the motivations for going public could be to time 
the market so as to take advantage of a high valuation.   
In contrast, implied changes in investment variables increase over time.  In the first year after the 
IPO, it implies that for every dollar raised, R&D increases by 18.8 cents, capital expenditures by 7.3 
cents, inventory by 1.7 cents, and acquisitions by 2.9 cents.  Over a three-year horizon, R&D rises by 64.6 
cents, capital expenditures by 17.9 cents, inventory by 2.2 cents, and acquisitions by 3.8 cents.  This 
effect is likely due to firms spending cash acquired in the IPO over a several year time period.  The 
relative use of the funds seems clear; by far the largest fraction of money raised in the IPO is used to fund 
R&D and capital expenditures, although firms still hold on to much of the cash they raised.  A much 
smaller fraction is used to increase inventories and engage in acquisitions.  Moreover, implied changes 
incurred by a dollar increase in internally-generated capital are generally smaller than those incurred by 
new capital, except for acquisitions and debt reduction.  All these results are consistent with the demand 
for an infusion of new capital to fund investments being an important motivation for IPOs. 
 
IV. Capital-Raising as a Motivation for Seasoned Equity Offers 
Equity is also issued in seasoned equity offers by firms that are already publicly-traded.  Potential 
motivations for these offers have been much discussed in the corporate finance literature.  The tradeoff 
theory suggests that firms should issue equity to fund investments when their leverage ratio is higher than 
their target ratio, while the pecking order theory predicts that when equity offers occur, they will be used 




will issue equity to take advantage of high stock prices.  These arguments are not mutually inconsistent; it 
is likely that some equity offers could occur for each reason.  It is even possible that overvaluation could 
cause additional investment, as is suggested in the model of Shleifer and Vishny (2003).
19 
Yet, there has been little empirical work documenting the extent to which demand for investment 
and mispricing can explain why firms issue equity.  More specifically, if equity offerings are used to fund 
investments, we do not know which type of investments they typically fund, and which tend to be funded 
from internally-generated capital.  This section applies the methods discussed above for IPOs to a large 
sample of SEOs with the goal of addressing these questions.  
 A. Univariate Analysis of Increases in Investments across SEO Offer Types 
Table V presents the means and medians of normalized increases for the seven accounting 
variables, broken down by SEO offer type.  For each category, the secondary-only offerings coincide with 
the significantly smaller growth rates for each of the seven variables than either primary or combined 
offers.  This pattern is consistent with the primary offerings raising capital for investments, as well as to 
increase liquidity through increasing cash and decreasing long-term debt.  Perhaps surprisingly, the 
combined offerings tend to have larger growth rates than the primary-only ones for each variable except 
R&D.  This difference is potentially due to a failure of the univariate statistics to control adequately for 
other factors.  We next attempt to control for such factors in a multivariate setting.   
B.  Multivariate Analysis of Changes in Accounting Variables across SEO Offer Types  
Table VI presents estimates of an equation predicting changes in each of the seven accounting 
variables following SEOs, using the specification presented in Equation (1).  As with IPOs, the 
specification includes primary and secondary capital separately, funds from other sources of capital, as 
well as a control for firm size and dummies for country and year.   
The results for SEOs are similar to IPOs in two respects.  First, the value of primary issues is 
positively correlated with most of the variables except for debt reduction, whereas proceeds from 
secondary shares are mostly unrelated to these variables.  Second, proceeds from primary capital are 
                                                 




mainly used in R&D and held as cash, while internally generated capital is used for acquisitions and debt 
reductions.   
However, the effect of fresh capital on cash holdings seems to be substantially smaller in SEOs 
than in IPOs.  For example, in Table VI, the change in cash holdings implied by a dollar increase in 
primary capital in SEO is 62.1 cents for year one and 46.8 cents for year four.  In comparison, the 
corresponding implied changes for IPOs from Table IV are 106.7 cents and 88.8 cents.  This difference 
suggests that market timing motivations may be more apparent in IPOs than in SEOs, consistent with the 
time series evidence reported in Table I. 
The implied increase following a dollar increase in other sources of funds is the largest for 
reductions in long-term debt.  Moreover, the implied increase in long-term debt reduction incurred for a 
marginal dollar of internally generated funds is much larger than that incurred by a marginal dollar raised 
in a seasoned equity offering.  This pattern is broadly consistent with Pulvino and Tarhan (2003), who 
show that a dollar increase in internally generated cash flows has larger effect on debt reduction than on 
increases in investment.  
 
V. Market Timing as a Motivation for Seasoned Equity Offers 
In the previous two sections, we have argued that demand for capital for investments appears to 
be an important motivation for issuing public equity.  We also documented that equity-issuing firms hold 
on to cash they raise for some time, especially after the IPOs, consistent with these firms timing the 
market.  In this section, we examine this possibility in a more direct manner by relating Tobin’s q to the 
proportion of secondary shares sold in SEOs and the sensitivity of investment to primary shares.  We 
restrict the tests in this section to SEOs since the tests require information on Tobin’s q prior to the equity 
offering. 
A. Tobin’s q and the Proportion of Secondary Shares Offered 
  The distinction between primary and secondary sales of equity makes it possible to examine 




demand for capital, while secondary issuances should coincide with a high demand on the part of the 
managers for liquidity.
20  In addition, if a firm’s stock is overvalued, Baker and Wurgler (2000) argue that 
managers have incentives to issue more of it, while if the stock is undervalued, managers will, at least at 
the margin, choose sources of financing other than equity.
21 
  The Baker and Wurgler argument also has predictions for the type of equity offering.  If a firm is 
issuing equity because managers feel the stock is overvalued, then the difference between the current 
stock price and true value represents rents transferred from investors to the selling shareholders.  In 
primary issues, these rents are shared by all shareholders; however, when the firm issues secondary 
shares, they are kept by the selling shareholders.  Since managers themselves presumably are one of the 
selling shareholders, we expect to observe the fraction of shares made up of secondary shares to be higher 
when the motivation for the sale is that the stock is overvalued. 
  We now examine this hypothesis empirically.  As a measure of valuation, we rely on Tobin’s q, 
estimated by the book value of assets minus book value of equity plus market value equity over the book 
value of assets as of the closest fiscal year end prior to the SEO announcement.  However, there are likely 
to be factors that cause rational deviations of observed q from 1.  For example, the presence of intangible 
assets, or a book value of assets that substantially deviates from its market value can affect q, even if the 
market values the firm correctly.  We follow Blanchard, Rhee, and Summers (1993) and estimate an 
equation predicting expected q as a function of a number of accounting variables.   
One statistical issue when estimating q cross-sectionally is that q is bounded below by 0, but not 
bounded above.  Thus if we were to use q as the dependent variable, the residuals would likely be skewed 
and not normally distributed.  In addition, the regression coefficients would in large part be determined by 
                                                 
20 Information on the identity of the seller of secondary shares is only available for about 20% of the sample.  In 
what follows, we are assuming that at least some of the shares sold belong to the firm’s managers.   
21 Baker and Wurgler (2000) is only one of a number of studies supporting this view.  Perhaps the most telling piece 
of evidence is that in their survey of CFOs of public corporations, Graham and Harvey (2001) find that two-thirds 
identify the amount to which their stock is overvalued or undervalued as an important consideration in the decision 




a few observations with very large q’s.  As a partial correction for this problem, we use the log of q rather 
than its level as the dependent variable in the first-stage regression.  We estimate the following model: 
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Q ε λ φ δ γ β α   
The estimation results are given by; 
 
          = 0.51  - 0.24(s/a)-1 + 0.14(s/a)-2 + 0.10(s/a)-3+ 0.09(s-1/s-2) + 0.01(s-2/s-3) + 0.14(s-3/s-4) + 0.22(i/a)-1+ 0.29(i/a)-2 
           (11.39) (-3.66)         (1.54)           (1.27)         (1.40)             (0.25)             (3.69)              (1.08)         (1.12) 
           + 0.22(i/a)-3  - 6.70(d/p)-1  - 1.10(d/p)-2 - 0.07(d/p)-3+0.28(R&D/a)-1 + 1.55(R&D/a)-2 + 1.28(R&D/a)-3 
             (0.63)         (-6.27)          (-1.44)         (-1.41)         (1.51)                 (3.37)                   (2.87) 
where t-stats for each coefficient is reported in the parenthesis with an R
2 value of 0.348.  
  Fitted values from this regression represent estimates of expected log q’s, conditional on the 
factors in the regression specification.  Residuals from this regression come from a number of sources, 
including model misspecification.  However, one important factor that will make up the regression 
residual is any potential misvaluation of the security.  Therefore, the residual from this regression is a 
potential proxy for the level of overvaluation or undervaluation of the stock.   
Table VII reports the results from regressing the proportion of secondary shares offered in SEOs 
on fitted values of ln[q] and residual ln[q] as well as the raw ln[q].  In the first four columns, the main 
regressors are raw ln[q].  Because raw q can also reflect rational valuations, we also regress the 
proportion of secondary shares on the fitted ln[q] and residual ln[q] from the first stage regression in 
columns (5) and (6).  Columns (1) and (2) use the full sample that has information on q, while in columns 
(3) and (4), the observations are restricted to be the same as in columns (5) and (6) where we require 
enough information for the first stage estimation.  Country and year fixed effects are included in all 
specifications.   
The results in Table VII indicate that the proportion of secondary shares is positively and 
significantly related to both ln[q] and to the residuals from the first-stage regression.  This finding appears 




secondary shares when their shares are relatively overvalued.  Presumably, when stocks are overvalued, 
insiders take advantage of the valuation and sell their shares in a secondary offering. 
B. Tobin’s q and Cross Sectional Difference in Sensitivity of Investments to Fresh Capital 
In addition to the type of offering, high valuations potentially affect the use of the proceeds from 
the offering.  To the extent that high valuations lead to equity offerings because of mispricing, we expect 
the proceeds to be kept as cash or other liquid assets.  Alternatively, if high valuations reflected by q’s 
occur because of high investment opportunities, then we would expect the proceeds of equity offerings 
from high q firms to be used primarily to fund investments.   
To test this hypothesis, we first sort the sample of by q in each country, and divide each country 
into three equal-sized terciles.  We then interact dummies indicating whether the firm is in the high q 
group, the medium q group, or the low q group with alternative sources of capital; proceeds raised from 
primary shares and internally generated capital.  The resulting estimates of this equation are presented in 
Table VIII.  Panel A contains coefficient estimates and t-statistics and Panel B reports the implied 
changes in the dependent variables when primary capital or other sources of funds is increased by a 
dollar.  Panel B also provides p-values from comparing coefficients between primary capital and other 
sources as well as between low q firms and high q firms.  As before, all regressions include country and 
year fixed effects as well as ln[total assets] and dummies for low q and high q firms, which are omitted 
for the sake of brevity. 
The results from Table VIII indicate that the effect of primary capital on subsequent investment 
varies according to the level of q prior to the SEO.  Firms with low q’s are more likely to use the funds 
they raised in increasing inventory, capital expenditures, acquisitions and reducing long-term debt 
compared to high q firms.  In contrast, firms with high q’s are more likely to hold on to the cash they 
raised than low q firms.  These differences between high q firms and low q firms are mostly significant 
for capital expenditures, debt reduction and cash holdings.  For example, the implied increase in capital 
expenditures by increasing primary capital by a dollar is 22.6 cents for low q firms but only 3.6 cents for 




up to 16.4 cents for high q firms.  On the other hand, cash holdings increase by 38.2 cents for low q firms 
but up to 56.4 cents for high q firms in the first year after the SEO.  Over 4 years this decreases to 23.1 
cents for low q firms and 42.0 cents for high q firms, still almost twice as much as the low q firms.   
These results suggest that the relative importance of market timing versus raising capital for 
investment depends on the firm level Tobin’s q’s.  High q firms appear to be more focused on timing the 
market, whereas low q firms seem to be issuing seasoned equities to meet their demand for capital.  This 
finding also suggests that our estimate of q reflects valuation rather than investment opportunities, since 
high q firms are less likely to invest out of marginal funds than are low q firms.
22 
 
V. Conclusion  
  Public equity offerings are one of the most visible and most studied events in finance.  Yet, the 
basic question of why firms issue publicly-traded equity has received relatively little attention from the 
empirical literature.  We provide some evidence on this question, using a sample of 16,958 IPOs and 
12,373 SEOs from 38 countries.  We estimate the actual use of the funds raised in both initial and 
seasoned offers.  In doing so, we control explicitly for the type of shares issued.  We also consider how a 
measure of the firms’ over or undervaluation affects the issuance, both in terms of the types of shares 
issued and the use of the proceeds. 
Our results suggest that equity offers are used both to raise capital to finance investment, and also 
to time equity markets to take advantage of high valuations.  Our estimates indicate that new capital 
raised in equity offerings is used to finance investments.  They imply that R&D expenditures increase by 
19 cents for a marginal dollar of capital raised in the first year following an IPO, and by 17 cents per 
marginal dollar raised in the first year following an SEO.  These figures increase to 85 cents per dollar 
raised if the changes are computed over the four-year period following IPOs and 54 cents for the four-
year period following SEOs.  We find similar relation, albeit smaller, for capital expenditures.  These 
                                                 
22 Lian (2005) finds that SEO firms with intense insider trading prior to the issuance do not invest more but keep the 
extra money in cash balances for years.  This finding suggests that both the insider trades and the equity offerings 




estimated expenditures are substantially, and statistically significantly, larger than the comparable 
numbers for a marginal dollar of internally-generated cash.  They strongly suggest that one motive behind 
the equity offer is to raise capital to finance this investment. 
We also find evidence consistent with the view that some equity offers are made to take 
advantage of high valuations.  Firms keep much of the money they raise in the equity offer as cash in the 
firm; this fraction is substantially higher when the firm has a high value of Tobin’s q, indicating that it is 
potentially overvalued.  In contrast, expenditures on investments are higher for low q firms than for high 
q firms.  In addition, SEOs done by firms with high value of q tend to have a higher fraction of secondary 
shares, suggesting that insiders are taking advantage of the high valuation to sell some of their shares.  
Overall, these results are consistent with view in which equity offers are sometimes used to finance 
investment, and sometimes, when a firm is valued very highly by the market, to exploit the high valuation 
both for the shareholders’ and managers’ benefits. 
 The ability of equity markets to provide financing for firms outside the U.S. and the U.K. has 
been widely questioned (see La Porta et al. (1997)).  Yet, we find that primary offerings are the 
predominate form of equity offerings in most of the world especially for IPOs, and primary offerings 
appear to be correlated with a number of factors measuring the demand for capital.  These findings are at 
least suggestive of the idea that firms around the world do in fact use equity markets to raise capital for 
investment.  The extent to which they do so, and the factors that determine across countries the 
differences in equity markets are important issues not analyzed here, and of course would be good topics 
for future research. 
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Sample Descriptive Statistics 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the equity offerings in the sample. Panels A-1 and A-2 
present the number of IPOs and SEOs across different regions over time and Panels B-1 and B-2 report 
the total amount of proceeds raised in IPOs and SEOs, respectively.  The last row in each panel reports 
the relative proportion of each region.  The sample period is from 1990 to 2003. 
  
Panel A-1: Number of IPOs 
Year 
Asia 




Europe  UK Latin  Am US  Canada Total 
1990 67  3  4  13     152  3  242 
1991  317  55  4  28 2 6  299 2  713 
1992  534  17 26  26 15 9  410 4  1,041 
1993 717  83  58  45 17  17 523 169  1,629 
1994 1,172  135  92  77 90  33  445  161 2,205 
1995 1,090  166  27  91 47  6  461  126 2,014 
1996 899  139  51  128 143  15 668 198  2,241 
1997 223  131  57  200 121  11 449 202  1,394 
1998  84  76  26  242 60  3 247 131 869 
1999 135  95  84  369 32  3 395  88  1,201 
2000 322  189  126  396 168  6 313 102  1,622 
2001 209  142  45  110 70  3  70  30 679 
2002  221  109 55  53 51 1  64 1  555 
2003  254  106 73  23 42 3  51 1  553 
               
Total 6,244 1,446  728  1,801 858  116 4,547 1,218  16,958 
% 36.8 8.5  4.3  10.6 5.1 0.7  26.8 7.2  100.0 
    
Panel A-2: Number of SEOs 
Year 
Asia 




Europe  UK Latin  Am US  Canada Total 
1990 9  1   20 3    141  7  181 
1991  9    3  44 3 6  365 5  435 
1992 25 9  4  32 2  9  353  11  445 
1993  47  28  3  72 5  13 446 227 841 
1994  82  66    106 111  21 293 174 853 
1995  76  89  4  70 95  18 432 127 911 
1996 56  172  2  87 117  24  509  218  1,185 
1997 105 83  5  137 84  24  423  161  1,022 
1998 49  80  1 156 95  7  295  93  776 
1999 131  222  5  123 77  4  306  268  1,136 
2000 152  223  17  207 248  3  311  277  1,438 
2001 118  147  34  152 272  8  207  185  1,123 
2002  124  209  38  95 224 11  199 15  915 
2003 215  237  12  91 288  10  250  9  1,112 
               
Total 1,198  1,566  128  1,392 1,624  158 4,530  1,777  12,373 




Table I ⎯ Continued 
 
Panel B-1: Total Amount of Proceeds (US$ mil) raised at IPOs  
Year 
Asia 




Europe  UK Latin  Am US  Canada Total 
1990 1,193  832  23  448    4,245  70 6,811 
1991 3,001  3,657  196  1,522 201  587  10,506  43  19,711 
1992 3,821  396  1,533  774 1,278  509  16,471  71  24,853 
1993 4,524 3,606  909  3,366 567 1,663  19,600 2,916  37,151 
1994 9,436 6,298  2,433  4,252 4,323 2,100  15,005 2,114  45,961 
1995  7,822  7,385 1,206  10,786 2,318 717  21,844 886  52,964 
1996 6,262  5,435  1,165  9,903 5,467  944  32,688 1,691  63,555 
1997 7,845 2,174  1,094  10,955 5,566 1,157  23,693 2,717  55,201 
1998 1,645  2,148  209  15,093 5,328  44  19,341 1,278  45,086 
1999  7,129  5,152 1,226  25,893 3,853 383  42,751 438  86,824 
2000 5,123  10,854  1,336  34,847 6,534  692  32,866 1,283  93,534 
2001 5,920  4,180  453  5,578 1,769 1,813  22,265  531  42,509 
2002 4,794  2,204  506  3,084 3,539  122  11,813  1  26,063 
2003 4,418  4,221  2,221  254 2,856  81 6,734  1  20,785 
            
Total 72,932 58,543  14,509  126,754 43,598 10,812  279,822 14,038  621,009 
% 11.7 9.4  2.3  20.4 7.0 1.7  45.1 2.3  100.0 
    
Panel B-2: Total Amount of Proceeds (US$ mil) raised at SEOs 
Year 
Asia 




Europe  UK Latin  Am US  Canada Total 
1990 513 30    1,672 966    6,353  65  9,598 
1991  251    461 1,976 969 386  24,412 149  28,604 
1992  706 789  694 1,690 2,186 960  23,633 261  30,918 
1993  986  1,686  380  8,108 989  1,081 29,477 12,040 54,748 
1994  3,889 2,977    9,950 4,060 1,731  20,711 5,305  48,622 
1995  3,962 6,092  169  4,033 3,634 1,705  36,063 6,166  61,824 
1996  3,086 8,394  76  12,910 6,210 1,319  43,473 4,608  80,076 
1997  4,603 3,224  1,205  20,907 4,962 3,265  37,903 7,835  83,904 
1998 1,990  2,859  81 19,387 6,252  534  40,518  4,087  75,707 
1999  6,554  21,269  149  30,739 4,119 1,387  55,013 7,352  126,581 
2000  9,727  25,858  546  30,457 14,068 3,814  76,601 7,594  168,665 
2001  3,737 7,240  1,038  20,117 10,875 3,597  30,734 4,724  82,062 
2002  4,007 7,833  372  14,460 4,682 3,635  26,347 2,316  63,652 
2003 9,008  13,324  540  6,828 5,980  2,795  30,951  604  70,030 
            
Total  53,017  101,576  5,710  183,235 69,952 26,209  482,187 63,105  984,991 
%  5.4  10.3  0.6  18.6 7.1 2.7  49.0 6.4  100.0 





Distribution of IPO and SEO Offer Types 
This table presents the distribution of IPO and SEO offer types across the regions in our sample.  An IPO 
or an SEO is characterized as primary only, secondary only or combined offering, according to the type(s) 
of shares being sold. Panels A-1 and A-2 present the distribution based on the number of IPOs and SEOs 
and Panels B-1 and B-2 provide breakdown according to the total proceeds raised.  The relative 
proportion of each offer type is reported in parentheses. The sample period is from 1990 to 2003. 
 







issues  Total issues 
   Number  %  Number %  Number %  Number 
Asia(ex  Japan)  5,990  (95.9)  69 (1.1)  185 (3.0)  6,244 
Japan 196  (13.6)  9  (0.6)  1,241  (85.8)  1,446 
Australia & New Z  637  (87.5)  22  (3.0)  69  (9.5)  728 
Continental Europe  1,276  (70.8)  100  (5.6)  425  (23.6)  1,801 
UK 751  (87.5)  9  (1.0)  98  (11.4)  858 
Latin Am  73  (62.9)  11  (9.5)  32  (27.6)  116 
US 3,096  (68.1)  53  (1.2)  1,398  (30.7)  4,547 
Canada 897  (73.6)  9  (0.7)  312  (25.6)  1,218 
            
Total 12,916  (76.2)  282  (1.7)  3,760  (22.2)  16,958 
             
             







issues Total  issues 
   Number  %  Number %  Number %  Number 
Asia(ex Japan)  689  (57.5)  482  (40.2)  27  (2.3)  1,198 
Japan 1,011  (64.6)  416  (26.6)  139  (8.9)  1,566 
Australia & New Z  100  (78.1)  25  (19.5)  3  (2.3)  128 
Continental Europe  791  (56.8)  514  (36.9)  87  (6.3)  1,392 
UK 1,382  (85.1)  195  (12.0)  47  (2.9)  1,624 
Latin  Am  110  (69.6)  24 (15.2)  24 (15.2)  158 
US  2,086  (46.0)  634 (14.0)  1,810 (40.0)  4,530 
Canada 1,337  (75.2)  19  (1.1)  421  (23.7)  1,777 
            
Total  7,506  (60.7)  2,309 (18.7)  2,558 (20.7)  12,373 




Table II ⎯ Continued 
 
Panel B-1: Total Amount of Proceeds (US$ mil) raised at IPOs 
Region  Primary  Secondary  Combined (primary & secondary) issues     Total Total  Total 
  only issues  only issues  primary  secondary  combined total    Primary Secondary  issues 
   amount % amount %  amount % amount %  amount %  amount %  amount %  amount 
Asia(ex Japan)  68,037 (93.3)  1,382 (1.9) 2,327 (3.2) 1,186 (1.6) 3,513 (4.8) 70,364(96.5) 2,568 (3.5) 72,932 
Japan 6,937 (11.9)  246 (0.4) 31,253 (53.4) 20,106 (34.3) 51,359 (87.7) 38,191(65.2) 20,352 (34.8) 58,543 
Australia & NZ  10,657 (73.4)  1,606 (11.1) 686 (4.7) 1,561 (10.8) 2,247 (15.5) 11,343(78.2) 3,166 (21.8) 14,509 
Cont’l Europe  68,152 (53.8)  16,187 (12.8) 18,794 (14.8) 23,620 (18.6) 42,414 (33.5) 86,947(68.6) 39,807 (31.4) 126,754 
UK 24,697 (56.6)  2,637 (6.0) 8,705 (20.0) 7,558 (17.3) 16,264 (37.3) 33,403(76.6) 10,196 (23.4) 43,598 
Latin Am  7,710 (71.3)  426 (3.9) 1,414 (13.1) 1,262 (11.7) 2,677 (24.8) 9,124(84.4) 1,688 (15.6) 10,812 
US 174,576 (62.4)  20,039 (7.2) 55,891 (20.0) 29,315 (10.5) 85,207 (30.5) 230,468(82.4) 49,354 (17.6) 279,822 
Canada 10,348 (73.7)  2 (0.0) 2,982 (21.2) 706 (5.0) 3,688 (26.3) 13,330(95.0) 708 (5.0) 14,038 
        
Total 371,115 (59.8)  42,526 (6.8) 122,054 (19.7) 85,314 (13.7) 207,368 (33.4) 493,169(79.4) 127,840 (20.6) 621,009 
                        
Panel B-2: Total Amount of Proceeds (US$ mil) raised at SEOs 
Region  Primary  Secondary  Combined (primary & secondary) issues     Total Total  Total 
  only issues  only issues  primary  secondary  combined total    Primary Secondary  issues 
   amount % amount %  amount % amount %  amount %  amount %  amount %  amount 
Asia(ex Japan)  29,196 (55.1)  21,153 (39.9) 1,692 (3.2) 976 (1.8) 2,668 (5.0) 30,888(58.3) 22,128 (41.7) 53,017 
Japan 57,501 (56.6)  26,901 (26.5) 7,013 (6.9) 10,162 (10.0) 17,175 (16.9) 64,514(63.5) 37,062 (36.5) 101,576 
Australia & NZ  3,145 (55.1)  2,216 (38.8) 146 (2.6) 203 (3.6) 349 (6.1) 3,291(57.6) 2,419 (42.4) 5,710 
Cont’l Europe  68,269 (37.3) 101,364 (55.3) 5,339 (2.9) 8,262 (4.5) 13,602 (7.4) 73,608(40.2) 109,627 (59.8) 183,235 
UK 35,522 (50.8)  28,559 (40.8) 3,459 2,411 5,870 38,981(55.7) 30,971 (44.3) 69,952 
Latin Am  9,490 (36.2)  6,637 5,330 (20.3) 4,753 (18.1) 10,082 (38.5) 14,819(56.5) 11,390 (43.5) 26,209 
US 182,558 (37.9)  113,547 (23.5) 109,785 (22.8) 76,298 (15.8) 186,083 (38.6) 292,343(60.6) 189,844 (39.4) 482,187 
Canada 43,612 (69.1)  3,341 12,296 (19.5) 3,856 (6.1) 16,152 (25.6) 55,908(88.6) 7,197 (11.4) 63,105 
     





Average Normalized Increases in Assets and Expenditures Following IPOs by Offer Type  
This table presents the mean and median increases in assets and expenditures following an IPO.  Increase 
in assets (total assets, inventory, cash) is defined as  ( ) ] 1 ) a   ln[( 0 0 + − ssets total V Vt , and increase in 
expenditures (CAPEX, acquisition, R&D, reduction in long term debt) is defined as  
] 1 )   ln[( 0 1 + ∑ = assets total V
t
i i , where 0 denotes the fiscal year end just prior to the IPO and t denotes 
number of years after year 0.  t-statistics and Mann-Whitney z-statistics for comparisons of means and 
medians between primary only and combined, and between combined and secondary only group are also 
provided.  Bold letters indicate statistical significance at less than 5%.  The sample period for this table is 
from 1990 to 2001. 
 
   N Mean      Median  Mann-Whitney
   Total  IPO offer type  IPO offer type  t-stat  IPO offer type  z-stat 



























                          
∆Total Assets 1  5,497  3,455  105  1,937  0.94  0.16 0.69 11.33 8.55 0.73 0.11 0.53 9.85 9.91
 2  4,725  2,945  90  1,690  1.13  0.35 0.94 7.15 7.17 0.93 0.29 0.79 6.25 8.09
 3  3,692  2,260  74  1,358  1.21  0.58 1.09 3.65 4.99 1.04 0.49 0.96 3.21 5.37
 4  2,870  1,745  58  1,067  1.28  0.68 1.19 2.25 4.18 1.12 0.60 1.07 1.85 4.32
                        
∆Inventory 1  5,348  3,352  100  1,896  0.07  0.03 0.06 3.29 2.11 0.01 0.01 0.01 1.34 1.40
   2  4,575  2,847  86  1,642  0.16  0.06 0.13 3.39 2.80 0.04 0.01 0.03 1.47 2.46
 3  3,579  2,194  72  1,313  0.22  0.08 0.18 3.67 2.71 0.07 0.03 0.05 1.93 2.40
 4  2,774  1,694  52  1,028  0.27  0.12 0.22 3.11 2.11 0.10 0.03 0.07 1.95 1.81
                        
∑CAPEX 1  5,043  3,300  96  1,647  0.19  0.09 0.16 3.96 3.46 0.11 0.06 0.10 1.63 5.19
 2  4,271  2,783  83  1,405  0.40  0.17 0.37 2.67 4.94 0.26 0.13 0.26 0.17 6.58
 3  3,292  2,116  68  1,108  0.56  0.29 0.54 1.00 4.60 0.39 0.22 0.42 -1.66 5.69
 4  2,536  1,622  53  861  0.69  0.40 0.69 0.09 4.09 0.52 0.31 0.56 -2.39 4.69
                        
∑Acquisition 1  4,124  2,735  65 1,324 0.07  0.02 0.08 -0.21 2.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.69 1.34
 2  3,401  2,237  58  1,106  0.18  0.07 0.19 -0.77 2.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 -2.79 2.80
 3  2,640  1,705  47  888  0.27  0.14 0.26 0.32 1.79 0.00 0.00 0.03 -2.36 2.12
 4  2,088  1,340  36  712  0.33  0.12 0.33 0.23 2.28 0.00 0.01 0.07 -3.23 1.61
                        
∑R&D 1  2,797  1,827  38  932  0.31  0.04 0.19 9.32 4.10 0.19 0.02 0.14 6.87 4.17
 2  2,392  1,541  35  816  0.63  0.10 0.40 9.30 4.37 0.48 0.05 0.31 7.02 4.10
 3  1,880  1,162  33  685  0.82  0.16 0.60 6.44 4.18 0.65 0.09 0.47 4.64 3.69
 4  1,464  869  27  568  0.97  0.23 0.77 4.07 3.82 0.80 0.12 0.67 2.66 3.51
                        
∆Cash 1  5,480  3,444  104  1,932  0.64  0.04 0.44 9.85 7.43 0.34 0.01 0.21 7.20 9.17
 2  4,711  2,937  89  1,685  0.56  0.06 0.44 5.75 5.77 0.22 0.01 0.17 3.73 7.43
 3  3,679  2,252  74  1,353  0.51  0.12 0.45 2.10 4.24 0.14 0.02 0.15 -0.16 5.13
 4  2,859  1,739  58  1,062  0.49  0.13 0.46 0.86 3.68 0.13 0.02 0.16 -1.34 4.63
                        
∑LT Debt  1  4,229  2,810  65  1,354  0.20  0.11 0.21 -0.67 2.82 0.07 0.03 0.09 -2.21 3.06
Reduction 2  3,561  2,337  54  1,170  0.31  0.18 0.29 1.44 2.19 0.16 0.08 0.16 0.16 2.32
 3  2,799  1,790  45  964  0.45  0.27 0.40 2.35 1.74 0.25 0.13 0.24 1.47 2.21





The Effect of the Type of Capital on Subsequent Increases in Assets and Expenditures in IPOs 
The dependent variable for asset-based variables (total assets, inventory, cash) is Y = 
() ] 1 )   ln[( 0 0 + − assets total V Vt , and for expenditures (CAPEX, acquisition, R&D, reduction in long term 
debt) is Y =  ] 1 ) 0   1 ln[( + ∑ = assets total t
i i V .  Independent variables are primary capital, secondary capital, 
other sources of funds, all of which are normalized by total assets, and ln[total assets].  All regressions 
include year and country fixed effects.  Coefficient for ln[total assets] and fixed effects are omitted for the 
sake of brevity.  Dollar changes are the implied change in the dependent variable when primary capital or 
other sources of funds is increased by $1 (for a median-sized firm in 1996 in the U.S.) Bold letters 
indicate statistical significance at 5%, using heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered by 
industry (2 digit SIC). The sample period for this table is from 1990 to 2001.  
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primary other   
V t  N  β1  t-stat  β2  t-stat  β3  t-stat  β1= β2 β1= β3 capital  sources R
2 
∆Total Assets 1  3,161  1.001 47.47 0.063 3.74 0.259 15.64 0.00 0.00 1.028 0.372 0.84
  2  2,402  0.839 33.28 0.050 1.12 0.387 13.99 0.00 0.00  0.841 0.351 0.77
  3  1,771  0.627 13.40 0.098 3.38 0.519 17.37 0.00 0.06 0.682 0.342 0.75
  4  1,326  0.499 7.92  0.129 2.72 0.596 11.40 0.00 0.34 0.598 0.362 0.73
                         
∆Inventory  1  3,093  0.034 1.96  -0.016 -0.64 0.023 2.40 0.08 0.45 0.017 0.016 0.07
  2  2,348 0.034  1.03 -0.046 -0.82 0.051 4.30 0.19 0.51 0.016 0.022 0.11
  3  1,736 0.043  0.77 -0.080 -1.32 0.103 4.24 0.15 0.24 0.022 0.033 0.18
  4  1,305 0.012  0.19 -0.055 -0.74 0.131 4.03 0.57 0.03  0.006 0.037 0.19
                         
∑CAPEX   1  3,137  0.131 6.12  -0.026 -1.02 0.057 4.40 0.00 0.00  0.073 0.044 0.19
  2  2,375  0.244 6.59  -0.011 -0.19 0.120 7.41 0.00 0.00  0.155 0.069 0.33
  3  1,750  0.239 5.30  -0.004 -0.05 0.216 9.05 0.03 0.60 0.179 0.099 0.39
  4  1,309  0.175 3.64  0.007 0.10 0.287 7.71 0.12 0.04  0.143 0.119 0.43
                         
∑Acquisition  1  3,016  0.054 2.53  -0.029 -1.75 0.077 4.96 0.02 0.11 0.029 0.058 0.13
  2  2,225  0.091 2.89  -0.050 -1.28 0.156 5.17 0.04 0.07 0.053 0.084 0.20
  3  1,624 0.056  1.11 -0.101 -1.70 0.222 5.58 0.13 0.00  0.038 0.092 0.25
  4  1,198 0.017  0.29 -0.037 -0.46 0.254 3.86 0.68 0.00  0.013 0.097 0.27
                         
∑R&D  1  1,956  0.299 8.60  0.001 0.01 0.033 4.63 0.00 0.00  0.188 0.029 0.48
  2  1,452  0.523 8.37  0.030 0.40 0.050 3.48 0.00 0.00  0.388 0.034 0.54
  3  1,042  0.723 8.08  0.094 0.95 0.059 2.01 0.00 0.00  0.646 0.032 0.53
  4  758  0.861 6.63  0.110 0.65 0.090 2.17 0.01 0.00  0.848 0.044 0.54
                         
∆Cash  1  3,152  0.981 57.98 0.116 3.73 0.144 6.94 0.00 0.00 1.067 0.219 0.79
  2  2,395  0.824 21.06 0.172 3.54 0.214 8.05 0.00 0.00 0.894 0.210 0.66
  3  1,766  0.758 14.07 0.253 3.85 0.246 8.86 0.00 0.00 0.894 0.176 0.58
  4  1,322  0.725 8.42  0.225 2.19 0.268 11.25 0.01 0.00  0.888 0.166 0.54
                         
∑LT Debt  1  3,112 0.032  1.54 -0.073 -3.01 0.105 4.80 0.00 0.01  0.018 0.082 0.15
   Reduction  2  2,341 -0.007  -0.29 -0.150 -3.47 0.140 5.12 0.01 0.00  -0.004 0.074 0.18
  3  1,728  -0.087 -2.50  -0.242 -3.16 0.230 7.12 0.05 0.00  -0.057 0.092 0.23





Average Normalized Increases in Assets and Expenditures Following SEOs by Offer Type  
This table presents the mean and median increases in assets and expenditures following an IPO.  Increase 
in assets (total assets, inventory, cash) is defined as  ( ) ] 1 ) a   ln[( 0 0 + − ssets total V Vt , and increase in 
expenditures (CAPEX, acquisition, R&D, reduction in long term debt) is defined as  
] 1 )   ln[( 0 1 + ∑ = assets total V
t
i i , where 0 denotes the fiscal year end just prior to the IPO and t denotes 
number of years after year 0.  t-statistics and Mann-Whitney z-statistics for comparisons of means and 
medians between primary only and combined, and between combined and secondary only group are also 
provided.  Bold letters indicate statistical significance at less than 5%.  The sample period for this table is 
from 1990 to 2001. 
 
   N Mean      Median  Mann-Whitney
   Total  IPO offer type  IPO offer type  t-stat  IPO offer type  z-stat 



























                          
∆Total Assets 1  6,457  3,529  1,193 1,735 0.48  0.26 0.66 -10.77 20.45 0.34 0.14 0.53 -13.09 23.77
 2  5,185  2,873  928 1,384 0.63  0.41 0.90 -11.57 17.86 0.50 0.29 0.79 -13.58 19.41
 3  3,884  2,192  686 1,006 0.72  0.51 1.01 -9.42 14.12 0.60 0.40 0.93 -11.07 15.15
 4  2,967  1,735  524 708 0.79  0.61 1.10 -7.78 11.20 0.67 0.50 1.00 -8.69 11.42
                        
∆Inventory 1  6,083  3,321  1,105 1,657 0.04  0.03 0.07 -6.72 7.63 0.01 0.01 0.02 -8.19 6.84
   2  4,959  2,733  877 1,349 0.08  0.06 0.13 -6.93 8.63 0.02 0.02 0.04 -7.43 6.03
 3  3,730  2,090  657 983 0.12  0.09 0.17 -5.30 7.05 0.03 0.03 0.06 -5.41 5.42
 4  2,795  1,619  485 691 0.15  0.12 0.21 -3.91 5.79 0.05 0.04 0.08 -4.89 4.69
                        
∑CAPEX 1  6,024  3,269  1,083 1,672 0.14  0.10 0.16 -3.97 8.74 0.08 0.07 0.10 -7.62 11.01
 2  4,784  2,627  832 1,325 0.29  0.21 0.34 -5.07 10.29 0.18 0.15 0.24 -7.37 11.70
 3  3,569  1,978  621 970 0.43  0.30 0.49 -3.70 10.21 0.30 0.23 0.37 -5.60 10.50
 4  2,703  1,550  470 683 0.54  0.39 0.61 -2.94 8.43 0.40 0.32 0.47 -3.95 7.76
                        
∑Acquisition 1  5,381  2,871  918 1,592 0.11  0.05 0.10 1.14 6.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.57 3.34
 2  4,283  2,313  708 1,262 0.18  0.11 0.20 -2.17 6.32 0.00 0.01 0.02 -4.03 4.54
 3  3,193  1,741  529 923 0.22  0.16 0.26 -2.27 4.72 0.02 0.03 0.05 -2.70 2.81
 4  2,394  1,361  384 649 0.26  0.20 0.31 -2.40 3.62 0.04 0.04 0.07 -2.23 2.23
                        
∑R&D 1  3,186  1,616  531 1,039 0.14  0.05 0.13 1.12 8.84 0.05 0.02 0.05 1.57 6.12
 2  2,495  1,280  398 817 0.29  0.11 0.27 1.07 8.60 0.12 0.04 0.12 2.05 5.34
 3  1,837  938  299 600 0.37  0.16 0.37 0.30 6.94 0.17 0.07 0.14 2.12 3.82
 4  1,346  716  232 398 0.44  0.22 0.40 1.19 4.51 0.22 0.10 0.12 3.22 1.28
                        
∆Cash 1  6,431  3,514  1,187 1,730 0.18  0.06 0.26 -7.07 15.37 0.04 0.01 0.10 -8.31 17.08
 2  5,167  2,864  923 1,380 0.16  0.08 0.24 -5.63 9.93 0.03 0.01 0.06 -5.78 9.84
 3  3,866  2,183  681 1,002 0.15  0.08 0.23 -4.59 7.44 0.03 0.01 0.06 -5.19 7.60
 4  2,953  1,728  520 705 0.16  0.11 0.24 -3.87 5.29 0.04 0.03 0.06 -3.64 4.85
                        
∑LT Debt  1  5,457  2,898  934 1,625 0.11  0.09 0.15 -5.92 6.74 0.03 0.02 0.04 -2.97 4.63
Reduction 2  4,339  2,324  717 1,298 0.20  0.17 0.25 -4.21 4.98 0.09 0.08 0.09 -1.30 2.55
 3  3,234  1,761  527 946 0.30  0.27 0.37 -3.94 4.16 0.16 0.14 0.19 -2.21 2.67





The Effect of the Type of Capital on Subsequent Increases in Assets and Expenditures in SEOs 
The dependent variable for asset-based variables (total assets, inventory, cash) is Y = 
() ] 1 )   ln[( 0 0 + − assets total V Vt , and for expenditures (CAPEX, acquisition, R&D, reduction in long term 
debt) is Y =  ] 1 ) 0   1 ln[( + ∑ = assets total t
i i V .  Independent variables are primary capital, secondary capital, 
other sources of funds, all of which are normalized by total assets, and ln[total assets].  All regressions 
include year and country fixed effects.  Coefficient for ln[total assets] and fixed effects are omitted for the 
sake of brevity.  Dollar changes are the implied change in the dependent variable when primary capital or 
other sources of funds is increased by $1 (for a median-sized firm in 1996 in the U.S.) Bold letters 
indicate statistical significance at 5%, using heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered by 
industry (2 digit SIC). The sample period for this table is from 1990 to 2001.  
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primary other   
V t  N  β1  t-stat  β2  t-stat  β3  t-stat  β1= β2 β1= β3 capital  sources R
2 
∆Total Assets 1 5,004  0.926 33.85 0.243 6.20 0.363 11.86 0.00 0.00 0.967 0.314 0.68
  2 3,894  0.735 36.46 0.258 4.43 0.527 14.12 0.00 0.00 0.902 0.364 0.66
  3 2,858  0.586 10.16 0.289 3.03 0.631 13.74 0.00 0.59 0.864 0.377 0.66
  4 2,138  0.512 6.06  0.365 3.90 0.673 15.95 0.26 0.10 0.900 0.368 0.65
                          
∆Inventory  1 4,842  0.056 2.26  0.006 0.22 0.019 4.27 0.07 0.14 0.047 0.013 0.09
  2 3,797  0.068 2.42  -0.009 -0.20 0.051 3.20 0.12 0.50 0.057 0.024 0.12
  3 2,788 0.080 1.83  0.030 0.45 0.091 4.00 0.47 0.80 0.072 0.033 0.18
  4 2,086  0.163 2.62  0.064 1.00 0.097 3.71 0.33 0.29 0.156 0.029 0.20
                         
∑CAPEX   1 4,987  0.069 4.25  0.000 0.00 0.114 3.67 0.08 0.15 0.059 0.081 0.20
  2 3,877  0.167 3.82  0.024 0.48 0.182 4.28 0.07 0.83 0.157 0.097 0.30
  3 2,841  0.178 4.37  0.046 0.56 0.272 5.49 0.10 0.23 0.196 0.121 0.39
  4 2,129  0.200 3.04  0.075 0.65 0.323 6.71 0.26 0.19 0.248 0.125 0.45
                          
∑Acquisition  1 4,834  0.135 3.07  -0.128 -4.87 0.160 6.66 0.00 0.44 0.124 0.122 0.22
  2 3,750  0.142 2.97  -0.057 -1.45 0.217 6.49 0.01 0.01  0.142 0.122 0.28
  3 2,731  0.113 2.70  -0.077 -1.52 0.247 6.37 0.01 0.00  0.127 0.112 0.29
  4 2,019 0.092 1.76  -0.064 -0.99 0.259 6.46 0.06 0.00  0.110 0.097 0.31
                         
∑R&D  1 2,744  0.200 4.81  0.037 1.01 0.012 1.52 0.03 0.00  0.166 0.008 0.36
  2 2,077  0.374 7.07  0.042 0.50 0.025 1.62 0.02 0.00  0.304 0.011 0.44
  3 1,482  0.518 6.69  0.158 1.23 0.046 1.87 0.08 0.00  0.441 0.016 0.44
  4 1,064  0.594 7.75  0.251 1.56 0.089 2.72 0.12 0.00  0.535 0.025 0.42
                          
∆Cash  1 4,992  0.619 19.87 0.242 14.41 0.121 5.10 0.00 0.00 0.621 0.101 0.52
  2 3,886  0.425 8.67  0.166 10.68 0.175 5.72 0.00 0.00  0.425 0.098 0.37
  3 2,851  0.357 11.20 0.177 3.86 0.219 6.68 0.00 0.00 0.397 0.098 0.36
  4 2,132  0.375 4.85  0.290 4.14 0.221 5.28 0.40 0.06 0.468 0.086 0.33
                          
∑LT Debt  1 4,921 0.016 0.70  -0.087 -3.22 0.145 4.58 0.02 0.00  0.014 0.108 0.18
   Reduction  2 3,811 0.006 0.17  -0.145 -3.08 0.222 5.62 0.03 0.00  0.006 0.129 0.24
  3 2,774 -0.013 -0.33  -0.201 -3.46 0.292 6.01 0.01 0.00  -0.016 0.145 0.28





The Relationship between Proportion of Secondary Shares Offered and Tobin’s q in SEOs 
The dependent variable is the proportion of secondary shares offered in SEOs.  ln[q] is the logarithm of book value of assets minus book 
value of equity plus market value equity over book value of assets as of the closest fiscal year end prior to the SEO announcement.  Fitted 
ln[q] and residual ln[q] are based on the following first stage estimation; 
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q ε λ φ δ γ β α   
Columns (1) and (2) use the full sample, and columns (3) through (6) are restricted to those observations that have enough information for 
the first stage estimation.  We use heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered by industry (2 digit SIC).The sample period is from 
1990 to 2003.  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        
ln[q]        0.037**         0.091***        0.013           0.086***                                 
      (2.507)         (6.853)         (0.521)         (3.455)                                    
        
fitted ln[q]                                                                       -0.106***        0.004    
                                                                     (-3.059)         (0.101)    
        
residual ln[q]                                                                        0.063**         0.115*** 
                                                                      (2.332)         (4.712)    
        
ln[total assets (US$ mil)]                        0.063***                        0.053***                        0.049*** 
                     (10.152)                         (5.464)                         (5.226)    
        
ln[total proceeds/total assets]                        0.005                          -0.016                          -0.015    
                      (0.690)                        (-0.923)                        (-0.890)    
        
Country, Year fixed effects  Y/Y  Y/Y  Y/Y  Y/Y  Y/Y  Y/Y 
        
R2  0.127 0.189 0.143 0.204 0.158 0.210 
        





The Effect of the Type of Capital and Tobin’s q on Subsequent Increases in Assets and Expenditures in SEOs  
The dependent variable for asset-based variables is Y =  ( ) ] 1 )   ln[( 0 0 + − assets total V Vt , and for expenditures is Y =  ] 1 ) 1   ln[( 0 + ∑ =
t
i assets total Vt . The 
independent variables are primary capital, other sources of funds, both of which are normalized by total assets and interacted with 3 dummy variables (LoQ, 
MedQ and HiQ) reflecting the level of q’s in each country.  Country and year fixed effects as well as ln[total assets],  LoQ and HiQ are included in all 
regressions(not reported).   Panel A presents coefficients and t-stats using heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered by industry (2 digit SIC). Panel 
B presents implied change in the dependent variable when primary capital or other sources of funds is increased by $1 and also p-values from comparing 
coefficients. The sample period for this table is from 1990 to 2001. 
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V T  N  β  t-stat  β  t-stat  β  t-stat  β  t-stat  β  t-stat  β  t-stat 
∆Total Assets  1       4,275  1.227 12.60 0.467 11.34 0.952 25.52 0.512  8.98 0.843 32.91 0.364 11.82 
  2       3,364  0.992  9.72 0.620 19.57 0.752 14.06 0.666 12.47 0.625 24.53 0.476 11.38 
  3       2,500  0.809  8.39 0.662 14.83 0.607  7.19 0.742 13.12 0.446  6.31 0.545  9.45 
  4       1,875  0.876  4.61 0.669  9.61 0.580  3.36 0.723  7.18 0.258  2.95 0.665 14.36 
                             
∆Inventory  1       4,144  0.214 2.50  0.016 0.56  0.077 3.72  0.028 2.75  0.032 1.79  0.014 2.13 
  2       3,283  0.227 2.00  0.043 1.84  0.064  2.04 0.074  2.54 0.068  1.97 0.050  2.79 
  3       2,441  0.239  1.69  0.052  1.83  0.039  0.77  0.109 2.13  0.052 0.94  0.076 3.27 
  4       1,830  0.302  1.55  0.065 2.30  0.087 1.22  0.132 2.32  0.088 0.90  0.092 3.19 
                             
∑CAPEX   1       4,265  0.245  5.83 0.212  4.75 0.098  2.59 0.157  3.71 0.046  2.43 0.089  3.80 
  2       3,356  0.380  8.27 0.281  5.84 0.119  2.04 0.241  3.58 0.119  2.73 0.131  4.05 
  3       2,491  0.426  6.43 0.356  6.98 0.159  2.00 0.336  4.17 0.151  2.72 0.233  5.54 
  4       1,869  0.560  5.83 0.352  6.69 0.245  2.30 0.376  4.88 0.121 1.20  0.317 5.92 
                             
∑Acquisition  1       4,140  0.278  5.12 0.241  7.97 0.283  5.61 0.294  9.00 0.132  2.94 0.132  4.43 
  2       3,249  0.219  2.41 0.279  9.46 0.222  4.26 0.307  8.10 0.073  1.97 0.159  4.91 
  3       2,396  0.170  1.90  0.316  6.31 0.278  4.19 0.324  8.11 0.069 1.52  0.179 3.81 
  4       1,771  0.218  1.64  0.343  4.77 0.398  5.99 0.281  5.43 0.014 0.18  0.215 4.53 
                             
∑R&D  1       2,290  0.062  1.46  -0.016  -1.11  0.090 2.52  -0.011 -0.57 0.156 3.75  -0.002 -0.19 
  2       1,763  0.180 2.35  -0.025 -1.77 0.188 3.33  -0.005 -0.26 0.332 3.94  0.022 0.85 
  3       1,274  0.376 2.35  -0.031 -1.40 0.390 3.89  0.030 1.01  0.492 5.08  0.057 1.35 
  4          912  0.556 2.30  -0.032 -0.94 0.597  3.83 0.111  2.22 0.557  5.22 0.090  2.00 
                             
∆Cash  1       4,271  0.396 3.63  0.011 0.43  0.454  8.05 0.073  2.54 0.606 17.84 0.152  5.94 
  2       3,362  0.203  2.69 0.056  2.77 0.323  7.01 0.129  6.12 0.463  6.51 0.219  7.03 
  3       2,499  0.191  3.08 0.061  3.31 0.288  3.70 0.236  3.45 0.348  7.11 0.231  6.89 
  4       1,873  0.198  2.78 0.066  4.12 0.365  3.15 0.243  2.91 0.318  3.18 0.269  5.21 
                             
∑LT Debt  1       4,208  0.284  5.59 0.336 12.35 0.084  2.53 0.251  5.90 0.013 0.92  0.059 3.76 
   Reduction  2       3,301  0.205 3.97  0.424  11.40  -0.016 -0.28 0.374 6.57  0.043 1.10  0.114 3.97 
  3       2,435  0.154 2.12  0.496  12.31  0.034 0.48  0.453 7.97  0.049 0.84  0.132 3.53 
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       Dollar Changes  p values from H0: βi = βj 
     Lo Q  Medium Q  High Q  primary vs. other  High Q vs. Low Q 
V t   N   primary  other   primary  other   primary  other   Lo Q  High Q  primary  other  
∆Total Assets  1    4,275  1.244  0.39  1.084  0.46  1.015  0.40  0.00 0.00  0.00  0.04 
  2    3,364  1.136  0.44  1.027  0.52  0.937  0.41  0.00 0.00  0.00  0.01 
  3    2,500  0.988  0.41  1.043  0.51  0.859  0.42  0.19  0.37  0.00  0.12 
  4    1,875  1.204  0.37  1.122  0.44  0.643  0.48  0.38  0.00 0.00  0.96 
                       
∆Inventory  1    4,144  0.198  0.01  0.069  0.02  0.025  0.01  0.05  0.30  0.03  0.94 
   2    3,283  0.207  0.02  0.059  0.04  0.053  0.02  0.07  0.56  0.17  0.77 
  3    2,441  0.221  0.02  0.037  0.04  0.044  0.03  0.15  0.64  0.21  0.30 
  4    1,830  0.290  0.03  0.087  0.04  0.081  0.02  0.19  0.97  0.30  0.21 
                       
∑CAPEX  1    4,265  0.226  0.16  0.090  0.11  0.036  0.06  0.42  0.11  0.00 0.01 
  2    3,356  0.373  0.17  0.121  0.14  0.105  0.07  0.02  0.84  0.00 0.00 
  3    2,491  0.467  0.20  0.192  0.16  0.166  0.10  0.32  0.25  0.00 0.02 
  4    1,869  0.679  0.17  0.336  0.16  0.164  0.13  0.08  0.11  0.00  0.53 
                       
∑Acquisition  1    4,140  0.294  0.21  0.296  0.24  0.116  0.11  0.55  0.99  0.02 0.02 
  2    3,249  0.243  0.19  0.248  0.19  0.068  0.09  0.47  0.01  0.13  0.02 
  3    2,396  0.215  0.20  0.365  0.17  0.078  0.08  0.14  0.05  0.26 0.06 
  4    1,771  0.294  0.19  0.542  0.12  0.017  0.08  0.45  0.01  0.18 0.15 
                       
∑R&D  1    2,290  0.053  -0.01  0.076  -0.01  0.119  0.00  0.13  0.00 0.04  0.40 
  2    1,763  0.142  -0.01  0.151  0.00  0.263  0.01  0.02 0.00  0.09 0.08 
  3    1,274  0.307  -0.01  0.333  0.01  0.460  0.02  0.02 0.00  0.43  0.03 
  4      912   0.492  -0.01  0.582  0.03  0.628  0.03  0.03 0.00  1.00  0.01 
                       
∆Cash  1    4,271  0.382  0.01  0.430  0.05  0.564  0.13  0.00 0.00  0.06  0.00 
  2    3,362  0.190  0.03  0.299  0.07  0.433  0.12  0.04 0.01  0.02  0.00 
  3    2,499  0.202  0.03  0.315  0.10  0.397  0.10  0.04 0.03  0.02  0.00 
  4    1,873  0.231  0.03  0.443  0.09  0.420  0.10  0.07  0.69  0.14  0.00 
                       
∑LT Debt  1    4,208  0.084  0.20  0.297  0.29  0.010  0.04  0.34  0.00 0.00  0.00 
Reduction  2    3,301  -0.019  0.25  0.255  0.32  0.039  0.06  0.01  0.07  0.01 0.00 
  3    2,435  0.053  0.28  0.233  0.38  0.054  0.06  0.00  0.30 0.29  0.00 
  4    1,818  0.083  0.22  0.565  0.34  -0.014  0.07  0.35  0.10  0.04 0.00 Appendix Table I. Distribution of IPO Offer Types 
 
This table presents the distribution of IPO and SEO offer types across the countries in our sample.  An 
IPO or an SEO is characterized as primary only, secondary only or combined offering, according to the 
type(s) of shares being sold. Panels A-1 and A-2 present the distribution based on the number of IPOs and 
SEOs and Panels B-1 and B-2 provide breakdown according to the total proceeds raised.  The relative 
proportion of each offer type is reported in parentheses. The sample period is from 1990 to 2003. 
 
Panel A-1: Number of IPOs 
Region  Nation  Primary only  Secondary only  Combined  Total issues 
    Number % number % number %  number 
Asia Hong  Kong 432  (81.1) 2  (0.4)  99  (18.6)  533 
  India  3,582  (97.7)  53 (1.4)  30 (0.8) 3,665 
  Indonesia  148  (98.7)  1 (0.7)  1 (0.7)  150 
  Malaysia  388  (93.3)  7 (1.7)  21 (5.0)  416 
  Pakistan  177  (99.4)  1  (0.6)    178 
 Philippines  57  (95.0)      3  (5.0)  60 
  Singapore  275  (89.9)  3 (1.0)  28 (9.2)  306 
 South  Korea  280  (99.6)      1  (0.4)  281 
  Taiwan  454  (99.3)  2 (0.4)  1 (0.2)  457 
 Thailand  197  (99.5)      1  (0.5)  198 
 Japan  196  (13.6)  9  (0.6)  1,241  (85.8)  1,446 
Pacific  Australia  602  (87.6)  20 (2.9)  65 (9.5)  687 
  New  Zealand  35  (85.4)  2 (4.9)  4 (9.8)  41 
Europe Austria  28  (71.8)  2  (5.1)  9  (23.1)  39 
 Belgium 29  (64.4)  1  (2.2)  15  (33.3)  45 
 Denmark  31  (64.6)  2  (4.2)  15  (31.3)  48 
 Finland  29  (60.4)  4  (8.3)  15  (31.3)  48 
 France  387  (78.7)  37  (7.5)  68  (13.8)  492 
 Germany  256  (65.0)  7  (1.8)  131  (33.2)  394 
 Greece 126  (96.9)      4  (3.1)  130 
 Ireland  18  (72.0)      7  (28.0)  25 
 Israel  77  (77.8)      22  (22.2)  99 
 Italy  68  (54.8)  10  (8.1)  46  (37.1)  124 
 Netherlands  36  (46.2)  6  (7.7)  36  (46.2)  78 
 Norway  73  (92.4)      6  (7.6)  79 
  Portugal  7  (70.0)  3  (30.0)    10 
  Spain  21 (60.0)  8 (22.9)  6 (17.1)  35 
  Sweden  53 (58.2)  11 (12.1)  27 (29.7)  91 
  Switzerland  26 (50.0)  8 (15.4)  18 (34.6)  52 
 UK  751  (87.5)  9  (1.0)  98  (11.4)  858 
  Turkey  11  (91.7)  1  (8.3)    12 
Latin  Am Argentina  6 (46.2)  4 (30.8)  3 (23.1)  13 
 Bermuda  14  (73.7)      5  (26.3)  19 
  Brazil  10 (66.7)  2 (13.3)  3 (20.0)  15 
  Chile  14  (87.5)  1 (6.3)  1 (6.3)  16 
 Mexico  29  (54.7)  4  (7.5)  20  (37.7)  53 
North Am  Canada  897  (73.6)  9  (0.7)  312  (25.6)  1,218 
 US  3,096  (68.1)  53  (1.2)  1,398  (30.7)  4,547 
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Panel A-2: Number of SEOs 
Region  Nation  Primary only  Secondary only  Combined  Total issues 
    Number % number % number %  number 
Asia Hong  Kong  269  (40.8)  381  (57.7) 10  (1.5)  660 
  India  199  (94.8)  9 (4.3)  2 (1.0)  210 
  Indonesia  11  (40.7)  16  (59.3)   27 
  Malaysia  17  (63.0)  10  (37.0)   27 
  Pakistan  1  (100.0)      1 
  Philippines  3 (42.9)  3 (42.9)  1 (14.3)  7 
 Singapore 77  (66.4)  32  (27.6)  7  (6.0)  116 
  South  Korea 57  (93.4)  4  (6.6)   61 
 Taiwan  44  (60.3)  23  (31.5)  6  (8.2)  73 
 Thailand  11  (68.8)  4  (25.0)  1  (6.3)  16 
 Japan  1,011  (64.6)  416  (26.6)  139  (8.9)  1,566 
Pacific Australia  94  (80.3)  20  (17.1)  3 (2.6)  117 
  New  Zealand 6  (54.5)  5  (45.5)   11 
Europe  Austria  13  (54.2)  11  (45.8)   24 
  Belgium  23 (62.2)  8 (21.6)  6 (16.2)  37 
  Denmark  66  (79.5)  17  (20.5)   83 
 Finland  34  (56.7)  22  (36.7)  4  (6.7)  60 
 France  113  (48.5)  111  (47.6)  9  (3.9)  233 
 Germany 116  (65.2)  55  (30.9)  7  (3.9)  178 
 Greece  9  (60.0)  5  (33.3)  1  (6.7)  15 
 Ireland  68  (73.1)  18  (19.4)  7  (7.5)  93 
  Israel  28 (50.0)  9 (16.1)  19 (33.9)  56 
 Italy  24  (46.2)  23  (44.2)  5  (9.6)  52 
 Netherlands  63  (52.1)  46  (38.0)  12  (9.9)  121 
 Norway  139  (85.8)  22  (13.6)  1  (0.6)  162 
  Portugal  10  (71.4)  4  (28.6)   14 
 Spain  15  (25.9)  41  (70.7)  2  (3.4)  58 
 Sweden  47  (37.9)  70  (56.5)  7  (5.6)  124 
 Switzerland  20  (27.0)  48  (64.9)  6  (8.1)  74 
 UK  1,382  (85.1)  195  (12.0)  47  (2.9)  1,624 
  Turkey  3 (37.5)  4 (50.0)  1 (12.5)  8 
Latin  Am  Argentina  6 (50.0)  3 (25.0)  3 (25.0)  12 
  Bermuda  13 (61.9)  5 (23.8)  3 (14.3)  21 
 Brazil  40  (85.1)  6  (12.8)  1  (2.1)  47 
  Chile  18  (94.7)  1  (5.3)   19 
  Mexico  33 (55.9)  9 (15.3)  17 (28.8)  59 
North Am  Canada  1,337  (75.2)  19  (1.1)  421  (23.7)  1,777 
  US  2,086 (46.0)  634 (14.0) 1,810 (40.0)  4,530 
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Panel B-1: Total Amount of Proceeds (US$ mil) raised at IPOs 
Region  Nation  Primary  Secondary  Combined (primary & secondary) offerings  Total  Total  Total 
    only offerings  only offerings primary  secondary  combined total  Primary  Secondary  issues 
   amount % amount %  amount %  amount % amount %  amount %  amount %  amount
Asia Hong  Kong  11,121 (85.7) 63 (0.5) 1,240 (9.6) 551 (4.2) 1,791 (13.8) 12,361 (95.3) 614 (4.7) 12,976
 India  6,479 (94.0) 93 (1.3) 147 (2.1) 171 (2.5) 318 (4.6) 6,626 (96.2) 264 (3.8) 6,889
 Indonesia  5,418 (90.6) 155 (2.6) 343 (5.7) 66 (1.1) 410 (6.8) 5,762 (96.3) 222 (3.7) 5,983
 Malaysia  3,294 (74.7) 631 (14.3) 241 (5.5) 244 (5.5) 485 (11.0) 3,534 (80.2) 875 (19.8) 4,409
 Pakistan  628 (88.2) 84 (11.8) 628 (88.2) 84 (11.8) 711
 Philippines  1,723 (94.5) 66 (3.6) 35 (1.9) 101 (5.5) 1,790 (98.1) 35 (1.9) 1,824
 Singapore  4,756 (87.7) 303 (5.6) 271 (5.0) 94 (1.7) 365 (6.7) 5,027 (92.7) 397 (7.3) 5,424
 South  Korea  18,550 (99.8) 10 (0.1) 24 (0.1) 35 (0.2) 18,560 (99.9) 24 (0.1) 18,585
 Taiwan  11,421 (99.5) 53 (0.5) 4 (0.0) 1 (0.0) 5 (0.0) 11,425 (99.5) 54 (0.5) 11,479
 Thailand  4,648 (99.9) 4 (0.1) 1 (0.0) 4 (0.1) 4,651 (100.0) 1 (0.0) 4,652
 Japan  6,937 (11.9) 246 (0.4) 31,253 (53.4) 20,106 (34.3) 51,359 (87.7) 38,191 (65.2) 20,352 (34.8) 58,543
Pacific Australia  9,846 (73.8) 1,477 (11.1) 647 (4.9) 1,370 (10.3) 2,018 (15.1) 10,493 (78.7) 2,848 (21.3) 13,341
 New  Zealand  811 (69.4) 128 (11.0) 39 (3.3) 190 (16.3) 229 (19.6) 850 (72.7) 319 (27.3) 1,168
Europe Austria  1,140 (57.5) 417 (21.0) 229 (11.6) 197 (9.9) 426 (21.5) 1,370 (69.1) 614 (30.9) 1,984
 Belgium  3,345 (58.8) 1,610 (28.3) 445 (7.8) 289 (5.1) 734 (12.9) 3,790 (66.6) 1,899 (33.4) 5,689
 Denmark  1,323 (49.9) 88 (3.3) 457 (17.2) 786 (29.6) 1,243 (46.8) 1,780 (67.1) 874 (32.9) 2,654
 Finland  960 (41.7) 366 (15.9) 491 (21.3) 484 (21.0) 976 (42.4) 1,452 (63.1) 850 (36.9) 2,302
 France  7,890 (46.3) 3,069 (18.0) 1,478 (8.7) 4,588 (26.9) 6,066 (35.6) 9,368 (55.0) 7,656 (45.0) 17,025
 Germany  16,851 (51.8) 917 (2.8) 5,736 (17.6) 9,029 (27.8) 14,765 (45.4) 22,587 (69.4) 9,946 (30.6) 32,533
 Greece  3,057 (97.3) 57 (1.8) 29 (0.9) 86 (2.7) 3,114 (99.1) 29 (0.9) 3,143
 Ireland  456 (45.9) 362 (36.5) 175 (17.6) 537 (54.1) 818 (82.4) 175 (17.6) 993
 Israel  1,912 (66.0) 704 (24.3) 282 (9.7) 986 (34.0) 2,615 (90.3) 282 (9.7) 2,898
 Italy  4,173 (43.7) 1,621 (17.0) 2,076 (21.7) 1,685 (17.6) 3,761 (39.4) 6,248 (65.4) 3,307 (34.6) 9,555
 Netherlands  5,484 (39.3) 2,197 (15.7) 3,790 (27.1) 2,500 (17.9) 6,290 (45.0) 9,274 (66.4) 4,697 (33.6) 13,971
 Norway 1,794 (71.0) 554 (21.9) 180 (7.1) 734 (29.0) 2,348 (92.9) 180 (7.1) 2,528
 Portugal  583 (72.5) 221 (27.5) 583 (72.5) 221 (27.5) 805
 Spain  3,208 (41.3) 2,984 (38.4) 609 (7.8) 964 (12.4) 1,573 (20.3) 3,817 (49.1) 3,949 (50.9) 7,765
 Sweden 7,378 (74.2) 710 (7.1) 893 (9.0) 962 (9.7) 1,854 (18.7) 8,271 (83.2) 1,672 (16.8) 9,943
 Switzerland  8,240 (65.5) 1,960 (15.6) 914 (7.3) 1,469 (11.7) 2,382 (18.9) 9,154 (72.8) 3,429 (27.2) 12,583
 UK  24,697 (56.6) 2,637 (6.0) 8,705 (20.0) 7,558 (17.3) 16,264 (37.3) 33,403 (76.6) 10,196 (23.4) 43,598
 Turkey  359 (93.0) 27 (7.0) 359 (93.0) 27 (7.0) 385
Latin Am  Argentina  346 (44.1) 84 (10.7) 251 (32.0) 103 (13.1) 354 (45.2) 597 (76.2) 187 (23.8) 783
 Bermuda  2,518 (82.2) 230 (7.5) 314 (10.3) 544 (17.8) 2,748 (89.7) 314 (10.3) 3,062
 Brazil  538 (38.1) 212 (15.0) 312 (22.1) 349 (24.7) 661 (46.8) 850 (60.2) 562 (39.8) 1,412
 Chile  1,365 (90.6) 6 (0.4) 117 (7.8) 19 (1.2) 135 (9.0) 1,482 (98.4) 24 (1.6) 1,506
 Mexico 2,942 (72.7) 124 (3.1) 505 (12.5) 477 (11.8) 982 (24.3) 3,447 (85.1) 602 (14.9) 4,049
North Am  Canada  10,348 (73.7) 2 (0.0) 2,982 (21.2) 706 (5.0) 3,688 (26.3) 13,330 (95.0) 708 (5.0) 14,038
 US  174,576 (62.4) 20,039 (7.2) 55,891 (20.0) 29,315 (10.5) 85,207 (30.5) 230,468 (82.4) 49,354 (17.6) 279,822
                 




Appendix Table I ⎯ Continued 
 
Panel B-2: Total Amount of Proceeds (US$ mil) raised at SEOs 
Region  Nation  Primary  Secondary  Combined (primary & secondary) offerings  Total  Total  Total 
    only offerings  only offerings  primary  secondary  combined total  Primary  Secondary  issues 
   amount % amount % amount %  amount % amount %  amount %  amount %  amount
Asia Hong  Kong  3,773 (21.6)  12,915 (73.8) 506 (2.9) 309 (1.8) 815 (4.7) 4,279 (24.4) 13,224 (75.6) 17,504
 India 3,980 (90.4)  413 (9.4) 2 (0.0) 5 (0.1) 7 (0.2)  3,982 (90.5) 419 (9.5) 4,401
 Indonesia  685 (43.2)  901 (56.8)   685 (43.2) 901 (56.8) 1,587
 Malaysia  547 (59.3)  376 (40.7)   547 (59.3) 376 (40.7) 923
 Pakistan  100 (100.0)    100 (100.0) 100
 Philippines  28 (8.1)  210 (61.0) 35 (10.3) 71 (20.6) 106 (30.9)  63 (18.4) 280 (81.6) 344
 Singapore  3,553 (65.2)  1,391 (25.5) 308 (5.7) 196 (3.6) 504 (9.3)  3,862 (70.9) 1,587 (29.1) 5,449
 South  Korea  6,236 (87.5)  887 (12.5)   6,236 (87.5) 887 (12.5) 7,123
 Taiwan  9,649 (66.7)  3,845 (26.6) 610 (4.2) 365 (2.5) 975 (6.7)  10,259 (70.9) 4,210 (29.1) 14,468
 Thailand  644 (57.6)  214 (19.1) 231 (20.6) 30 (2.7) 261 (23.3)  875 (78.2) 244 (21.8) 1,119
 Japan  57,501 (56.6)  26,901 (26.5) 7,013 (6.9) 10,162 (10.0) 17,175 (16.9)  64,514 (63.5) 37,062 (36.5) 101,576
Pacific Australia  2,932 (56.4) 1,921 (36.9) 146 (2.8) 203 (3.9) 349 (6.7)  3,078 (59.2) 2,124 (40.8) 5,202
 New  Zealand  213 (41.9)  296 (58.1)   213 (41.9) 296 (58.1) 508
Europe Austria  576 (41.2)  822 (58.8)   576 (41.2) 822 (58.8) 1,398
 Belgium  1,510 (39.6)  1,885 (49.5) 264 (6.9) 151 (4.0) 415 (10.9)  1,774 (46.6) 2,036 (53.4) 3,809
 Denmark  1,607 (60.9)  1,031 (39.1)   1,607 (60.9) 1,031 (39.1) 2,638
 Finland  2,987 (45.5)  2,894 (44.1) 227 (3.5) 457 (7.0) 684 (10.4)  3,214 (49.0) 3,350 (51.0) 6,564
 France  7,868 (22.3)  27,012 (76.4) 319 (0.9) 136 (0.4) 455 (1.3) 8,187 (23.2) 27,148 (76.8) 35,335
 Germany  13,264 (49.1)  12,862 (47.6) 285 (1.1) 599 (2.2) 884 (3.3)  13,549 (50.2) 13,461 (49.8) 27,010
 Greece 277 (53.4)  200 (38.5) 24 (4.6) 18 (3.4) 42 (8.0) 301 (58.0) 218 (42.0) 519
 Ireland  1,740 (47.5)  1,238 (33.8) 233 (6.3) 456 (12.4) 689 (18.8)  1,973 (53.8) 1,694 (46.2) 3,667
 Israel 1,728 (37.9)  1,001 (22.0) 1,194 (26.2) 632 (13.9) 1,826 (40.1)  2,922 (64.2) 1,633 (35.8) 4,555
 Italy  4,262 (55.8)  2,280 (29.9) 491 (6.4) 600 (7.9) 1,091 (14.3)  4,753 (62.3) 2,880 (37.7) 7,633
 Netherlands  18,485 (48.1)  18,377 (47.8) 495 (1.3) 1,053 (2.7) 1,548 (4.0)  18,979 (49.4) 19,431 (50.6) 38,410
 Norway  5,462 (75.2)  1,771 (24.4) 12 (0.2) 15 (0.2) 27 (0.4)  5,475 (75.4) 1,785 (24.6) 7,260
 Portugal  155 (16.2)  805 (83.8)   155 (16.2) 805 (83.8) 960
 Spain 5,674 (43.3)  6,930 (52.9) 192 (1.5) 303 (2.3) 496 (3.8)  5,866 (44.8) 7,233 (55.2) 13,100
 Sweden  1,378 (14.9)  7,314 (79.0) 305 (3.3) 266 (2.9) 571 (6.2)  1,683 (18.2) 7,579 (81.8) 9,263
 Switzerland  1,226 (5.9)  14,654 (70.7) 1,285 (6.2) 3,566 (17.2) 4,851 (23.4)  2,511 (12.1) 18,220 (87.9) 20,731
 UK 35,522 (50.8)  28,559 (40.8) 3,459 (4.9) 2,411 (3.4) 5,870 (8.4)  38,981 (55.7) 30,971 (44.3) 69,952
 Turkey  69 (18.0)  290 (75.5) 14 11 25   83 (21.7) 301 (78.3) 384
Latin Am  Argentina  741 (61.5)  90 (7.5) 136 (11.3) 239 (19.8) 375 (31.1)  877 (72.7) 329 (27.3) 1,206
 Bermuda  3,285 (33.9)  2,425 (25.0) 2,469 (25.5) 1,517 (15.6) 3,985 (41.1)  5,754 (59.3) 3,942 (40.7) 9,695
 Brazil  1,613 (18.1)  3,544 (39.7) 1,732 (19.4) 2,044 (22.9) 3,776 (42.3)  3,345 (37.4) 5,588 (62.6) 8,933
 Chile  524 (85.9)  86 (14.1)   524 (85.9) 86 (14.1) 610
 Mexico  3,326 (57.7)  493 (8.6) 993 (17.2) 953 (16.5) 1,946 (33.8)  4,319 (74.9) 1,446 (25.1) 5,765
North Am  Canada  43,612 (69.1)  3,341 (5.3) 12,296 (19.5) 3,856 (6.1) 16,152 (25.6)  55,908 (88.6) 7,197 (11.4) 63,105
 US 182,558 (37.9)  113,547 (23.5) 109,785 (22.8) 76,298 (15.8) 186,083 (38.6)  292,343 (60.6) 189,844 (39.4) 482,187
                  
 Total  429,293 (43.6)  303,717 (30.8) 145,060 (14.7) 106,921 (10.9) 251,981 (25.6)  574,352 (58.3) 410,639 (41.7) 984,991
 